


the AURANTIACO





Cover art by Rachel Hall

A Letter from the Editors

To the reader,

We write to you with hearts full of gratitude and pride as we release this second edition of *The Aurantiaco*. It has been a remarkable journey from the inception of this journal to its realization, and we were honored to be part of this journey as editors in chief.

The Aurantiaco was conceived by our founders, Meredith Johnson and Louise Franke, with a simple aim in mind: to provide a platform for Clemson undergraduates to showcase their work in the humanities and social sciences. Though the concept was simple, our ambitions were great. For Clemson--a high seminary of learning, steeped in beloved traditions--we wanted *The Aurantiaco* to become a tradition in its own right.

Tradition and *The Aurantiaco* are tightly interwoven. The very act of establishing this journal served to dispel a common misconception: that the liberal arts are passé, and their relevance is buried deep in the sands of antiquity, along with their greatest contributors. In looking at the submissions we have received and the community that has grown around *The Aurantiaco*, we would contend that the humanities are very much alive.

The Aurantiaco is on its way to becoming at once a tradition and a living, breathing entity on campus. We wanted to create a haven for students interested in the humanities and social sciences to interrogate the questions that drive them, and to connect with fellow travelers.

As we release the second edition, we are proud to see this vision increasingly realized. The first edition was a huge success, and we received an auspicious response from students, faculty, and staff alike. The submissions we drew in were exceptional, and reflect the breadth and depth of intellectual talent that exists at Clemson. The pieces contained within this edition are no exception.

The success of *The Aurantiaco* would not have been possible without the contributions of many. We would like to extend our heartfelt thanks to the authors, our team of editors and designers, Clemson staff, and our faculty advisor, Dr. Thomas. Their tireless efforts made this edition a joy to produce, and--we hope you'll agree--a pleasure to read.

Though graduation is bittersweet, we take comfort in the knowledge that we leave behind something meaningful and lasting. *The Aurantiaco* is a testament to the vibrancy of the humanities and social sciences, and a celebration of the intellectual curiosity and creativity of Clemson undergraduates.

It is our sincere desire that future generations of students will find in *The Aurantiaco* the same inspiration, connection, and sense of purpose that we have found, and that it will continue to be a Clemson tradition for years to come.

Ever loyal,



Cate Gangemi, *Editor in Chief*



Sergio Gonzalez Varela, *Editor in Chief*

This journal is dedicated to the incredible liberal arts community at Clemson University. Your collective contributions bring depth and diversity to the academic experience on this campus. Without your curiosity and intellectual spirit, our work would not be what it is today.

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“A System of Natural Liberty as Follows from Adam Smith’s Conception of Human Nature”

by Elizabeth Zarrilli



Throughout *The Wealth of Nations*, Adam Smith describes the conditions that lead to wealth and prosperity amongst nations. He concludes that a simple system of natural liberty best facilitates prosperity. Smith develops this claim by showing that the necessary tendencies and characteristics an individual or society needs to be productive are inherent in human nature and will arise naturally and unaided in well-ordered, liberal societies. Smith’s argument is effective because of the plurality of historical examples he provides and the derivation of his conclusion from basic tenets of human nature that he well establishes at the outset of his work. Therefore, independent of if one agrees with Smith’s conception of human nature, when starting from the original premises,

the reader can easily follow the logical progression toward a system of limited government that supplements the natural progression of human nature. Smith cites the division of labor as the greatest propellant of productivity, and thus wealth, throughout history. He shows that every industry in which it has been introduced has seen “a proportionable increase in the productive powers of labour” (Smith 12). Division of labor is a necessary condition for wealth in a society. Smith’s evidence to this point is the historical development of production across many industries such as pin-making, textiles, and almost every other manufactured item. In fact, the only industry that has not seen the great bounds in productivity from the division of labor is agriculture, which does not, by nature, allow for the same level of

specialization within its processes. This is further evidence to the effect of the division of labor as the “most opulent nations... generally excel all their neighbours in agriculture as well as in manufactures; but they are commonly more distinguished by their superiority in the latter than in the former” (13). This comparison of industries shows that those in which the division of labor is present will far exceed those without.

Given that the division of labor is a necessary condition for wealth, Smith must defend the political system that will best foster this effect, and he ultimately presents limited government based on natural liberty as this system. His position is based on the understanding of human nature he develops throughout the work. Individuals naturally tend toward specialization due to their “propensity to truck, barter and exchange,” a characteristic unique to man and stemming from one’s “constant occasion for the help of his brethren” which he achieves by leveraging others’ “self-love in his favour” (22-23). Man is inherently self-interested but dependent on his peers. Fortunately, man possesses the necessary reason that allows him to recognize the presence of comparative advantage and mutual self-interest that leads to the division of labor and complex systems of barter. The larger and more interwoven a society is, the more opportunity there is for these processes to develop.

Furthermore, Smith notes that the character of a nation’s people is determined by their spending habits between wasteful revenue and productive capital. This creates a moral implication regarding how a nation spends its wealth. It even appears at first that there may be a role for government to encourage capital investment since men may be led to spend their wealth wastefully. However, Smith notes that “though the principle of expense... prevails in almost all men on some occasions, and in some men upon almost all occasions, yet in the greater part of men... the principle of frugality seems not only to predominate, but to predominate very greatly” (436). Smith shows that government coercion toward frugality and the proper allocation of wealth to capital is unnecessary because on average men will be frugal, and more importantly, they will be frugal enough to make up for the prodigality of the minority. Human nature is

characterized by reason and self-interest and Smith argues that these characteristics incentivize individuals to avoid bankruptcy and its accompanying humiliation; thus, men spend their wages on productive capital for the sake of future prosperity. Again, Smith logically shows that human nature in the aggregate is enough to push society toward productivity and opulence.

In fact, it is not only that individuals are naturally equipped to self-govern and order society based on economic development, but governments that impede on natural liberty interrupt and prevent this progression from occurring. A profit seeking individual will always seek to direct his industry and investment such that “its produce may be of the greatest possible value” (572). However, only the individual is best able to judge and make decisions for himself based on his own value assessments. A “statesman who should attempt to direct private people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals, would ... assume an authority ... which would nowhere be so dangerous as in the hands of a man who had folly and presumption enough to fancy himself fit to exercise it” (573). Individuals can judge and direct their own property more efficiently than any of their peers and thus the authority of the government— particularly in manners of property, trade, and economic markets— must be limited, lest it interrupt and corrupt the naturally occurring processes of a market society. In support, he recounts European history from the fall of the Roman empire. The failure of the various nations to order themselves such as to allow for the development of the division of labor are deviations from their natural, uninhibited progressions. Instead, European history is full of absolute governments that misallocated capital and slowed the economic growth of the region. Had Europe instead been organized under limited governments seeking to protect private property and aid natural liberty, contemporary Europe would have been even more prosperous than it is presently.

One might here assert that Smith’s claim ignores the public goods that even a society of frugal, self-interested, and productive individuals would be unable to provide under natural liberty. It is for the provision of these goods, namely: national defense, internal justice, and other limited public goods that



Smith argues for a limited system of government. A well-ordered society will fail to provide these goods because they lack profit potential. It is the nature of the goods, not the nature of the people, that requires the presence of a governing body. In fact, to truly protect the specific nature of liberty required for Smith's described economic processes to occur, there needs to be political stability. Nothing is more dangerous to economic progression and private property than political instability or anarchy. Therefore, natural economic development requires a strong enough governing authority to subdue "that troublesome jealousy [of the sovereign], which, in some modern republics, seems to watch over the minutest actions, and to be at all times ready to disturb the peace of every citizen" (899). A correctly balanced government directed toward the protection of property and natural rights will provide enough liberty to allow human nature to flourish into the economic processes, such as division of labor and free trade, one observes in contemporary Western nations like England, while also subduing the society's descent into unrestrained licentiousness which is just as detrimental to economic prosperity as absolute tyranny.


Smith develops his argument for a "simple system of natural liberty" as the most conducive to economic prosperity by depicting a specific conception of human nature and using historical examples to track the logical progression of economic development from this nature. His argument is effective because it stems from a few simple, evidence-based assertions of human nature: a propensity to trade based on mutual benefit, a tendency toward specialization based on comparative advantage, and a desire to better one's living conditions. Much of the disagreement around Smith's conclusions stems from these assertions, not from the subsequent logical argument he develops. While these initial claims are very difficult to prove empirically, Smith does provide substantial historical evidence in their favor, and if one accepts these assumptions, Smith develops a very logically compelling argument to support the claim that "a simple system of human nature" will most effectively lead to prosperity.

“An Apparent Composure of Mind’: Self-identity in *Sense and Sensibility* and *The Woman of Colour*”

by Sydney Hovenstine

What makes a character tragic? Factors such as wealth or social status may easily explain such a state, but tragedy is instead defined by self-identity, which emphasizes one’s personal value over the opinion of society. Both Olivia Fairfield, the heroine of *The Woman of Colour* (written by an anonymous author) and Marianne Dashwood in Jane Austen’s *Sense and Sensibility*, experienced tragic fates through a common theme of societal marriage pressures. Each woman exhibits a different level of self-identity and therefore a different level of tragedy despite their similar positions in society.

Olivia Fairfield’s future seems bleak for a majority of *The Woman of Colour*, with the stage set for an undeserved and tragic ending. Destitute, unmarried, and in a foreign country, the odds of finding social acceptance were against her. Surprisingly, Olivia does not receive the common tragic ending of mixed-race women like her mother—she returns home to live on her father’s property as a single woman. The satisfying end to her story is not only novel for the time, but it ignores stereotypes set by other contemporary works in addition to exhibiting a complex female character. The anonymous author decides to avoid tropes used by other authors during their era: Olivia never falls prey to suicide, moves to India and changes her



name like another character suggests, or bears a child out of wedlock. The author’s conscious choice to allow Olivia to find happiness apart from a husband or social standing is a conscious one that should be commended. Olivia’s inspiring story provides a refreshing narrative not only for mixed-race women, but for all women and reminds them not to compromise their self-identity when faced with adversity.

With the marriage market demanding women possess talents that would get them married rather than benefit them, Olivia’s opposition to this stereotype does not go unnoticed: her eloquence

stands out among other women of her station. Her suitor (and cousin) Augustus says, “she is accomplished and elegant; but her accomplishments are not the superficial acquirements of the day...” (*The Woman of Colour* 103). Augustus recognizes that these “accomplishments” are empty skills women master for the sole purpose of impressing a man who would inherit their father’s financial responsibility for them. Yet, the author of *The Woman of Colour* created a character that readers today can relate to because her self-confidence and her perseverance through ostracization highlights her sense of self-identity. If Olivia had a tragic ending, it would have decimated that connection. Finally, the positive ending displays an idea more commonplace today: the author argues that the worth of women is not intertwined with men. While Olivia ultimately did not complete her father’s wishes regarding her marriage, she was still granted a happy, full life. Marianne Dashwood can be considered the antithesis of Olivia Fairfield. Although they were both respected, wealthy, middle-class women, their situations varied immensely, and Marianne’s story could be seen as the tragic version of Olivia’s. This would be a controversial opinion during the eras in which these women live, but it is difficult to be entirely content with Marianne’s ending, as Austen leaves the reader feeling disappointed about her fate. In the beginning of *Sense and Sensibility*, her exuberant, romantic personality was more relatable than her sister Elinor’s cold disposition. By the end of the novel, Elinor receives the loving marriage Marianne searches for while Marianne is left with a husband she must eventually learn how to love. Austen creates two characters that her audience can romantically empathize with in some way. Yet Elinor’s self-identity remains intact, while Marianne’s deepest desires for a fulfilling connection with her husband fall prey to a marriage of convenience and eliminates her sense of self-identity. Marianne’s beauty, her interest in marriage, and her eventual wealth should indicate a happy ending for her character. However, Marianne ultimately loses herself through the process of obtaining a husband and acquiring wealth. Her self-identity is compromised and consequently, her ending is tragic. When comparing Olivia from *The Woman of Colour* to Marianne, it is important to note that Olivia’s story is considered a triumphant one because throughout her tumultuous circumstances, she remains unmarried in accordance with her convictions and therefore keeps her identity. Though she faces pressure from her father, the decisions made are her own. Marianne, on the other hand, forfeits her identity when she loses her optimistic, passionate

sensibility.

According to Austen, “Marianne could never love by halves; and her whole heart became, in time, as much devoted to her husband as it had once been to Willoughby” (Austen 312). Instead of marrying for love like readers assumed she would, Marianne marries for practicality and becomes a conventional woman in society, forgoing her self-identity for that of her husband. Furthermore, Austen notably uses women with unexpected capabilities, particularly fiscal ones, to form Marianne’s character. During the Georgian era, the need for financial stability was entrenched in a woman’s plans for the future, and this is a pain Marianne feels sharply. When John Dashwood, Marianne’s half-brother, plans to offer financial assistance to his half-sisters, his wife “[does] not at all approve of what her husband intended to do” (Austen 7) and eventually convinces him to give them a fraction of what he planned. Consequently, Marianne’s increasing need for financial stability drives her to seek a husband. Her desire for physical comfort ultimately supersedes her self-identity. Her dreams for a passionate marriage filled with joy are suppressed once her social identity becomes intertwined in her husband. Austen’s intent is not for Marianne to be a tragic character, but readers living in today’s society marked with equality between the sexes cannot help but view her conclusion as disappointing and unsatisfying. The anonymous author of *The Woman of Colour* does not explicitly or consistently compare Olivia to another character like Austen did with Marianne and her sister Elinor, but her mother Marcia serves as a cautionary tale throughout the epistolary novel. Marcia’s sexual abuse and her untimely death stand as constant reminders of the fates that often met mixed-race, female characters during this time. Olivia’s fear of becoming ruined like Marcia reveals itself after finding out her suitor Augustus is already married. She laments, “‘Then what am I?’” (*The Woman of Colour* 142). Even still, the author created Olivia to stand as evidence that the stereotype surrounding women like her was unfair and not at all accurate. Olivia repeatedly receives comments about how she presents herself like a white British woman. Although blatantly racist, these comments reveal how her demeanor is a surprise to those who have only heard of



mixed-race women through the lens of prejudice.

Another indirect parallel the author makes is between Olivia and Jamaicans who are enslaved. When her suitor's aunt, Mrs. Merton, attempts to offend Olivia by comparing her to the people that worked on her father's plantation, Olivia simply says, "You will believe that I could not be wounded at being classed with my brethren!" (*The Woman of Colour* 77). Her confidence in her identity is only further proven from this quote. By making her endure situations that are considerably different than Marianne's, the audience cannot ignore the mental strength and impenetrable self-identity Olivia possesses.

Both Olivia Fairfield and Marianne Dashwood dealt with circumstances that delayed their ultimate goals in life and affected their sense of self-identity. Despite her unfortunate circumstances, Olivia's powerful sense of purpose fulfilled her lifelong wishes: the freedom to peacefully pursue her own interests in Jamaica. Although she did once love Augustus and was distraught when their relationship collapsed, she still finds happiness and achieves her goals without the assistance of a husband. While Marianne cannot fathom what Olivia has been through, she must deal with her own difficulties,

such as recovering from heartbreak, surviving a fever, and searching for new love. Conversely, Marianne began *Sense and Sensibility* with her self-identity as unwavering as Olivia's, but she loses her vivacious temperament over the course of the novel—particularly when she marries her husband. Austen and the anonymous author of *The Woman of Colour* consciously influence their characters' self-identities through the molding pressure of tragic circumstances and social norms. While Austen may not have intended to make Marianne a tragic character, her ending was inadequate compared to that of Olivia Fairfield; a complex character readers quickly connected to. These women are both challenged by misfortune and heartbreak, but the reader's estimation of whether their lives are tragedies directly depends on how and whether Olivia and Marianne retain their self-identity.

“Dignity and Disregard”

by Lucas Debenedetti

During the Second World War, over one million African American men and women served in every branch of the United States military including, for the first time, both the United States Marine Corps and the United States Army Air Corps. These men and women served with courage, distinction, and valor, but their service has generally been disregarded in the United States’ narrative of World War II, both during the war and in the years since its end, which can be seen most clearly in newspapers catered to white audiences. The disregard of African American soldiers’ service was not universal, however, as African American newspapers made a great effort to focus on the soldiers’ wartime experiences, positive and negative, as well as giving them the honor and respect they would not have received otherwise. During wartime, coverage of African American soldiers differed widely between black newspapers and newspapers that catered to white American audiences. African American newspapers, such as the *Pittsburgh Courier* and *Chicago Defender*, made an effort to dignify the soldiers’ service while hastening the issue of civil rights and desegregation to the forefront. On the other hand, newspapers that catered more towards white audiences such as *The Washington Post*, *New York Times*, and *Atlanta Constitution* generally disregarded

African American soldiers’ service and supported the idea of a segregated military.

One of the best ways to analyze the differences in how white and black newspapers portrayed African American soldiers is to study the media’s response to the riots that took place between white and black soldiers at training camps all across America. This is most evident in the level of information each newspaper gathered and cited in its discussion about the riots. African American newspapers such as the *Pittsburgh Courier* and *Chicago Defender* tended to acquire more evidence by interviewing the African American soldiers and comparing their accounts to the military’s press releases. On the other hand, the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *Atlanta Constitution* tended to accept what the military’s press releases said as fact and failed to obtain more information through interviews or other research thereby reflecting the disregard that was shown to many African American



servicemen. Most of the reports from these three papers also tended to blame African American troops without providing any context to causation. These differences in the portrayal of the soldiers and discussion surrounding race riots can be viewed in each newspaper's response to the Alexandria, Louisiana riot that became known as the Lee Street Riot.

The Lee Street Riot occurred on January 11, 1942, less than a month after the attack on Pearl Harbor and after the United States had joined the war. The riot is said to have begun after African American soldiers "witnessed the brutal arrest of an African American soldier by white MPs" and responded by attacking the policemen.¹ In response, military police, local police, and white townspeople joined into the melee and killed some African American soldiers and wounded many others. The African American soldiers came from three different units: the 367th Infantry, the 758th Tank Battalion, and the 350th Field Artillery Regiment, stationed nearby in Camp Claiborne and Camp Livingston.² In the end, the reports vary but it is estimated that upwards of ten African American soldiers died as a result of the riot with many more being wounded. The numbers of dead and injured are uncertain because the "army refused to investigate the incident," and the soldiers involved were barred from speaking to the press.³

In the days that followed the Lee Street Riot, the *Atlanta Constitution*, *New York Times*, and *The Washington Post* all ran articles discussing the details of the conflict, but failed to fully research the causes of the melee. The *Atlanta Constitution* ran one short article about the riot. The article is very vague in all descriptions of the incident and does not include any African American perspectives. Those perspectives would have had to come from local African American townspeople as the Army barred the soldiers from speaking of it. The only sources the article cites are from unnamed Army officials and a local police chief, both of which give little insight into how the events leading up to the riot transpired. While the article does not directly indict the African American troops, it nevertheless leads the reader to view them as the guilty party. The *Atlanta Constitution* characterizes the soldiers as being uncontrollable since the white military police were unable to calm them down and needed state and city police to provide reinforcements. This illustrates the unfair treatment that African

Americans received by white media outlets.⁴ Similarly, *The Washington Post* ran an equally uninformative article regarding the Lee St. Riot, reflecting a similar disregard of African American experiences and perspectives of the incident. However, this article is more direct in its blame, ascribing the cause of the riot to the attempt of a white officer to arrest an African American soldier, thereby instigating the other soldiers to attack him.⁵ The article adds no context as to why the soldier was being arrested and ignores any antagonization by the white citizens of the town or any information from the soldiers themselves.

Additionally, this article also makes the distinction that most of the involved soldiers came from the northern states of New York, Pennsylvania, and Illinois. This distinction is made to place the blame on the African American soldiers from the North by casting them as hostile to the unfamiliar status quo of the South. The *New York Times*' article on the Lee Street Riot was more descriptive of the incident than both the *Atlanta Constitution* and *The Washington Post*'s articles; however, it still ignored any potential wrongdoing by white soldiers and citizens. The article describes the riot as occurring after a white military policeman arrested a soldier outside of an African American movie theater, causing the other soldiers to attack the white officer.⁶ Similar to *The Washington Post*'s article, the *Times*' article makes the distinction that most of the involved troops were African American troops who came from the North. Though the article does not further develop this fact, it is important, nonetheless, as it once again reinforces the articles' assertion that African American soldiers from the North were at fault because of their unfamiliarity with how the South operated at the time, ignoring the fact that African American soldiers from the South also took part in the riot, and were also not accepting of segregationist rules and policies. Instead of blaming the evils of segregation and Jim Crow laws for causing the riot, white media outlets blamed African American servicemen and their response to these laws. Though more descriptive than the articles by the *Atlanta Constitution* and *The Washington Post*, this article still ignores key facts such as how "a white vigilante mob swarmed into the melee," and took a very active role in the violence.⁷ This conflicts with the articles written by the other two newspapers above. Whereas the *Atlanta Constitution* and *The Washington Post* completely neglected the



that sawed-off shotguns were promiscuously used by law enforcement officers and soldiers,” against the African Americans soldiers and citizens.¹⁰ Articles from white newspapers discussed none of these brutal tactics utilized by whites in the riot. Instead, these newspapers portrayed the riot as being a violent conflict started by African American troops and being valiantly put down by white military and local police without much conflict or civilian involvement. It was the African American newspapers and media who discovered the true nature of the riot and attempted to disclose what really happened in Alexandria by illuminating both sides of the conflict.

Descriptions of violence on both sides of the conflict were not the only differences between the coverage of African American and white newspapers, however. African American papers also rejected the notion that the riot only occurred because the soldiers from the North were upset by the South’s Jim Crow policies with which they were unfamiliar by pointing out that soldiers “born and reared in the South are as much opposed to the typical Southern white treatment...as those from the North.”¹¹ By debunking the myth that only northern African Americans were involved, these newspapers changed the narrative to focus on the evils of segregation rather than the reactions of those in new environments. The fact that southern African American soldiers were just as involved as northern troops would completely disprove the southern argument for segregation and show how it was not a ‘separate but equal’ and acceptable institution.

The *Courier* and *Defender* also both published articles that criticized the War Department, and the United States government as whole, for causing the riots by instituting and upholding a segregated military. In contrast, the white newspapers offered no criticism of the War Department’s policy on segregation as a result of this riot. The *Defender* called the riot “the best and most effective argument that can be made against a policy of exclusion, segregation, and discrimination,” because it revealed how keeping African American soldiers in the same area as whites, but not making them equal to their white counterparts, only caused animosity and hate to grow.¹² Similarly, the *Courier* asked, “how can the interest of colored citizens in national unity and ultimate victory be preserved when the Government permits such disgraceful occurrences?”¹³ This event happened very

violent acts of white local and military police, the *New York Times* admits some wrongdoing on the part of the white populace, although it falls short of communicating the full story, establishing that the conflict was far more complicated than reported by the other newspapers.

In stark contrast, the *Pittsburgh Courier* and *Chicago Defender*, two newspapers that were directed towards African American audiences, each ran a number of descriptive articles on the riot in Alexandria that examined the African American point of view and criticized the War Department’s policy of a segregated military, illustrating the different treatment African American servicemen received from black and white media outlets. In a January 31st article, the *Courier* went as far as to acknowledge that the riot was started by a few African American and white soldiers who deserved punishment for their actions.⁸ However, the article notes that while the white military policemen who played a role in the riot were left unpunished, every African American soldier “who happened to be in town, many of them being married men visiting their wives,” were subjected to “great indignities,” that included being shot in the street and beaten by white mobs.⁹ This article fleshes out the conflict in a much more comprehensive way than any of the white newspapers had, revealing not only that there were two sides to the conflict, but only one, the African American side, was being considered and punished for the incident, while the white mob went largely unreported and unpunished. A February 7, 1942 article by the *Courier* uncovered more information on the riot, particularly how “it was found

early into the war effort, and the *Courier* and *Defender* realized that if these riots continued and involved white soldiers and citizens were left unpunished, African American morale for the war effort would steeply decline as a result. The Lee Street Riot occurred a little over a month after the attack on Pearl Harbor and the United States' entrance into the war, and it set the stage for more riots to come. Throughout the war, there were many more riots that occurred between African American troops and white soldiers or townspeople, and the white media consistently placed much of the blame on the African American troops. The majority of these riots occurred in the American South; however, there are many instances of riots occurring on northern and western military bases across the United States, when white citizens or soldiers antagonized the African American troops and citizens, to the point of instigating a violent reaction. During these riots African American soldiers were killed, injured, and beaten by white soldiers, townspeople, and police, and even African American military police in some cases, only to receive the blame for starting the riots. Some of these riots could have been avoided had the military not placed these soldiers in the most outwardly racist region of the United States, where white citizens and soldiers alike did not respect the uniform when the uniform was being worn by a non-white group. Instead, these soldiers were sent to the South where they were harassed to the point of rioting, and then were given the brunt of the blame by the military and media alike. In short, "the white soldiers were treated as victims and not held accountable. The white officer in command was not held accountable," whereas the African American soldiers' perspectives were ignored, and they were portrayed as the riot's agitators.¹⁴ These were men willing to fight and die

for their country, but these riots reminded them that they were truly fighting a war on two fronts. Overall, the Lee Street Riot is a singular instance of the disparity in the coverage of African American soldiers between African American newspapers and white newspapers. It reflects the greater trends of avoiding covering African American soldiers in an honorable or at least honest light as well as an overall contentment with segregationist policies by white newspapers. African American newspapers, such as the *Pittsburgh Courier* and *Chicago Defender*, focused on fighting segregation by bringing to light the racism, violence, and disregard African American soldiers faced during their military service.

“The Origins of the Written Word & Literacy in the Middle Ages”

by Lauren Gouveia



Reading and writing seem as naturally human as sleeping and eating in the modern world. Technology has progressed so quickly in the past centuries that even physical handwriting feels antiquated to some. However, the development of widespread literacy and use of written record is quite a recent development relative to all of human history. The shift from oral to written culture led to a staggering transition in human memory and understanding. Written record came to the forefront of European society through the highest institutions of authority and, over the course of centuries, led to a radical sense of individualism and liberty for the common man.

In the many millennia before a fully integrated written culture, human memory was the only way for knowledge to be passed down through generations. The eldest members of a

community were the bridge between old generations and new, passing stories and information down in an oral culture. As Walter Ong describes it, “in functionally oral cultures the past is not felt as an itemized terrain, peppered with verifiable and disputed ‘facts’ or bits of information. It is the domain of the ancestors, a resonant source for renewing awareness of present existence, which itself is not an itemized terrain either” (Ong, 141). In a world without records from prior years, there was no strict “truth” or “fact.” This system meant that most orally transmitted knowledge was not heavily analyzed or contested, but rather simply accepted as truth when coming from a trusted person. Without the transmission of written information, “the establishment of what passed for truth was simple and personal, since it depended on the good word of one’s fellows” (Clanchy, 297).

The knowledge of the time as told by the older members of the community was credible simply because of their age and experience. Transmitted solely through spoken words, knowledge itself was an ever-changing thing, never existing in the form of fact but instead evolving over generations.

While oral culture was the foundation of human consciousness, the necessity for immortal written records was felt at a critical point in history. Popularly known today as the “Dark Ages,” the era after the decline of the Roman Empire ushered in a new hierarchical structure which would last for over a millennium. Christianity, at its beginning a small cult practiced through whispers in the shadows, was legalized in 312 C.E. when Roman Emperor Constantine famously converted in a desperate attempt to win a losing battle (Wood, Tara). Mere decades later, in 380 C.E., Emperor Theodosius made Christianity the official religion of the Roman Empire. Thus, Christianity grew and spread rapidly, leaving the Church poised to be the sole great power after the definitive fall of Rome in 476 C.E. As the Church was the only universally organized system in Europe, it became the most trustworthy source for Europeans to obtain spirituality, security, and information.

With the Church at the center of medieval life, its practices represented protection and the assurance of heaven for all laymen. The monks of the medieval period were normally the only fully literate class in society, as they were the ones entrusted by God and, therefore, the people. These educated men sought knowledge beyond the immediate world in which they lived, and looked toward the past to find it.

Scholasticism was a school of thought which supported the idea that all divine knowledge was present at the time of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden. Scholastics believed that humans had strayed so far from the perfection of Eden because they had lost most of that divine knowledge (Wood, 8/31). This movement ultimately led to a revival of interest in studying classical texts, which were produced closer to the time of Eden. Books were also important for religious purposes, as monks relied on them for rituals, prayer, and to symbolize the glory and power of God. Illuminated texts, manuscripts with ornate, intricately detailed covers, were commonplace in monasteries to signify the texts’ significance and power. In the early medieval world, the men who were closest with God were also the men who were closest with books.



While religion was at the center of medieval life, manorialism and feudalism bolstered the top status of a group of secular leaders. In order to organize the administration of their holdings, these leaders relied on record-keeping and written documents for more practical purposes. Kings and lords could issue charters, public letters typically addressed to the entire public or Christian community (Clanchy, 87). People of power often used written agreements, called chirographs, authenticated by each other’s seals, to settle issues (Clanchy, 89). As the law developed and grew more standardized in 12th and 13th-century England, the necessity for keeping legal records also increased. In that same vein, financial records of kingdoms were also necessarily preserved. Life was heavily structured by authority, creating a dependence of the people on their superiors, who were in turn dependent on books.

The advantages of keeping written records, as opposed to a completely oral tradition, are apparent, but there is meaning deeper than practicality in the act of writing. The only way for one’s individual ideas, feelings, and thoughts to be preserved firsthand was through writing them down. Writing immortalized one’s thoughts for posterity. This concept of permanence through written record was indeed recognized by medieval thinkers. Richard de Bury, an English priest who lived during the 13th and 14th centuries, described how special permanence was. In his work “For the Love of Books”, he writes: “For the meaning of the voice perishes with the sound; truth latent in the mind is wisdom that is hid and treasure that is not seen; but truth which shines forth in books desires to manifest itself to every impressionable sense” (Wood, Tara). De Bury encapsulates the newfound possibility of a recorded legacy, which any literate person could leave through their writing.

The assimilation of writing into popular culture was a long process that depended heavily on the development and advancement of bookmaking. In Middle Ages Europe, ancient writing tools like papyrus scrolls and reed styli gave way to parchment manuscripts and quills. The birth of the codex, a “rectangular object bound or linked together with pages that had writing on both sides,” occurred by 103 C.E. and greatly improved the durability and transmission of writing (Wood, Tara). By 400 C.E., parchment codices had replaced scrolls as the common tools for writing manuscripts (Wood, Tara). Paper from animal gelatin was first created by the Italians in the 13th century, and by the late 15th century, mills had popularized paper production across France, Germany, and England (Wood, Tara). Widespread papermaking, and the invention of the printing press around the same time, spurred the first mass production of books. Advances in language also made reading more accessible. In the early Middle Ages, “to be literate meant to know Latin,” as Churchmen kept all of their records in Latin (Clanchy, 24). Slowly, a shift in writing from High Latin to the vernacular of the region helped change the definition of literacy, forging new paths for laymen, especially nobles and knights, to be able to read and write. Mass production of books written in the vernacular thus created many more opportunities for the dissemination of knowledge.

The spread of written language shocked the very core of medieval society. The period leading into the Renaissance and beyond was marked by an upshoot in literacy rates across the European continent. From the period 1500 to 1800, Roger Chartier says that in “Protestant as well as Catholic countries, in countryside as well as cities, and in the New World as well as the Old, more and more people were familiar with writing” (Chartier, 159). Though a bit later, this description of early modern Europe proves the fast-paced transition to a literate society after the developments of the Middle Ages. The expansion of literacy increased along with the appearance of centers of learning. The earliest universities, created by monks, turned to the liberal arts as the foundation of education and in turn spread a reliance on the book as a tool of learning (Wood, Tara). The idea of the library, organizing and synthesizing huge amounts of knowledge, had existed since the great model of Alexandria. Libraries became common at monasteries and universities for the benefits of public education. Increased literacy rates led to an increase in personal

home libraries, demonstrating the shift to reading for private enjoyment as opposed to public practicality. The idea of privacy was not synonymous with the earliest integrations of written record in European culture, but instead grew out of the individualism caused by the spread of literacy. “In composing a text, in writing something,” Walter Ong says, “the one producing the written utterance is also alone. Writing is a solipsistic operation” (Ong, 143). There is a stark contrast between the community of oral culture and the solitude of personal reading and writing. The prevalence of home libraries, also known as “studies,” in the early modern period as explained by Roger Chartier indicates that more and more laity had turned to the written word for enjoyment and personal pleasure. Chartier describes the “absolute liberty made possible by commerce with books,” the withdrawal from worldly and domestic affairs which reading offered to man without him ever having to leave his home (Chartier, 169). For the first time, man was exposed to a myriad of ideas, and was at liberty to explore any book he wanted whenever he wanted to. Reading presented a seamless escape of the mind from reality, and writing gave man the ability to create a new reality. This new, expanded power of writing cannot be overstated. Any person who organized his thoughts together and was able to put them down onto paper could now actively engage in, synthesize, and add to discussions about the world. This capability gave man an entirely different realm to explore: the individual, intellectual world.

Literacy transformed man’s existence over the course of the Middle Ages. As the legacy of written record was carried on by those who were involved in religious and secular bureaucracy, the large majority of people turned their attention toward Heaven and were unconcerned with matters of Earth. Advancements in writing technology, spanning many centuries, ultimately led to the dawn of the printing age. The early spread of books was synonymous with the diversification of ideas, giving more men than ever the ability to expose themselves to those ideas, and to then formulate their own. The capability of European society to transmit ideas, stories, emotions, thoughts, and data across time and space through writing fundamentally changed the thread of Western civilization. A sense of enlightenment and individuality was finally achievable for the common man, not by way of the institutions which had once dictated his whole world, but by way of his own mind.

“Evidentiary Links Between Familiars and Devil’s Marks in English Witch Trials”

by Lauren Rowe

In most English depictions of seventeenth century witches, the witch was always accompanied by a small animal-like being known as a familiar. Familiars were purported to be devils or demons that shapeshifted into the forms of cats, dogs, toads, and rabbits.

According to the accused witches, their familiars were given to them by the Devil to use as instruments of their will.¹ Later, these statements would be strengthened by the introduction of a new form of evidence: the devil’s mark. This paper argues that the intersection between familiars and devil’s marks on the accused’s body actively increased the number of people accused, convicted, and executed in the 1640s English witch trials.

Examining the relationship between the accused’s identity, her familiars, and devil’s marks demonstrates how linking witness testimony and physical evidence shaped the course of English witch trials between 1566 and 1645. Five

well-documented and recorded trials from Essex, Lancaster, and Middlesex counties, which range from the first English witch trial in 1566 to the beginning of the witch-hunt in 1645, will form the basis of this paper’s analytical argument. These trials are particularly apt for this study because of the completeness and accessibility of their records, as well as evidence that references and describes the use of familiars and devil’s marks as evidence against the accused. No single factor in the 1640s witch hunt could account for all the deaths that came out of the witch trials of 1645 - 1647 in England’s history. By examining the intersection between the accused witch’s identity, familiars, and devil’s marks, this paper aims to establish a new angle of evidentiary analysis to the existing scholarship by uncovering the connection between familiars and devil’s marks.

The devil’s mark functioned as the feeding site for the witch’s familiar which

provided empirical proof of the accused witch's connection with the diabolical. The connection between familiars and deformities on the body as physical evidence of witchcraft began slowly taking shape during the first witch trial in England in 1566. In Chelmsford, three women faced witchcraft accusations. In her confession, Elizabeth Francis claimed that her familiar, Satan, required a drop of blood in exchange for his services.² Francis gave him blood by "pricking herself, sometime in one place and then in another, and where she pricked herself there remained a red spot which was still to be seen."³ Francis' sister, Agnes Waterhouse, also admitted to feeding Satan by "pricking her hand or face and putting the blood in his mouth."⁴ The active participation of both women in providing sources of nourishment and feeding their familiar displays a unique level of agency compared to later trials. Francis and Waterhouse created the sites for Satan to feed on by pricking themselves to draw the blood out. In later trials, the accused witch stated that her familiar sought out hidden places on her body to suckle and created a devil's mark on that site.⁵ Additionally, Francis and Waterhouse did not explicitly state that Satan suckled from their bodies, only that he drank the blood each woman drew out. Without direct contact between the accused witch and the familiar, the "spots" on Francis and Waterhouse cannot be considered true devil's marks. However, their presence indicates the beginnings of an association between familiars and visible deformities on the body.

In Waterhouse's second examination, the jailer reached forward and "lifted up her kercher on her head and there was divers spots in her face and one on her nose."⁶ Waterhouse's deformities on her face were now plainly visible to the court, reinforcing the possibility of Waterhouse possessing a familiar and using it to commit her crimes. Even though her kercher, or kerchief, was removed, Waterhouse did not undergo the extensive body search seen in later trials since all of her "spots" were not hidden by her clothing. The hidden location of devil's marks in later trials indicates the secretive and sexual nature of the relationship between witches and their familiars.

As more witch trials occurred in England, the association between familiars and drinking the accused witch's blood grew stronger and shifted in nature. In 1612, at the Lancaster Assizes, nine people were convicted of using witchcraft to murder ten townsfolk. The first witch accused in Pendle Hill was Elizabeth Sowthernes who claimed in her confession that a familiar shaped like a brown dog would "get blood



under her left arme."⁷ As in other cases of suckling familiars, Sowthernes too pointed to a location on her body that would have typically hidden under clothing. Sowthernes' granddaughter, Alizon Device, also possessed a place on her body where she confessed that a familiar in the guise of a "Blacke-Dogge did with his mouth (as this Examinee then thought) sucke at her breast, a little below her Paps, which place did remain blew halfe a yeare next after."⁸ Anne Whittle claimed that the Devil appeared to her in the shape of a man and required her to give him "a place of her right side neere to her ribbes, for him to sucke vpon."⁹ All of the locations these women claimed familiars or Devils sucked from could have easily been hidden by their clothes unlike the "spots" present on Francis or Waterhouse in 1566. In this trial nearly fifty years later, familiars had evolved from drinking blood from pricked "spots" on the accused witch's body to actively sucking their blood. Familiars took over the active role in their relationship with the accused by sucking on her body without the accused needing to pierce her own flesh. However, the 1612 Lancaster trial records did not indicate that midwives, or other female expert witnesses, searched the bodies of these women for the familiar's sucking places because this evidentiary practice had not come into use yet.

Some of the accused witches at this 1612 trial faced witness testimony from their own family members. Before Jennet Device could even begin to accuse her mother of witchcraft, Elizabeth Device “according to her accustomed manner, outrageously cursing, cried out against the child in such a fearfull manner” that Jennet refused “to speake in the presence of her Mother.”¹⁰ Since her actions were described as her accustomed manner, Device most likely had a reputation for being contrary and spiteful toward other members of the community. Women who were “sharp-tongued, bad-tempered and quarrelsome” often had reputations for being village scolds or public nuisances. In many cases, the accused failed to endear herself to her neighbors, and her poor temperament left her without many allies or friends in the town.¹¹ Along with Device’s poor standing in her town, she also possessed physical defects to match the defects in her personality. Thomas Potts, the assize court clerk, described Elizabeth Device as “this odious Witch... branded with a preposterous marke in Nature, euen from her birth... her left eye, standing lower then the other; the one looking downe, the other looking vp, so strangely deformed.”¹² By conflating Device’s “odious” nature as a witch with her visible disability, Potts exemplified one of the more common beliefs from this era: that a physical deformity or disability could represent the manifestation of a witch’s diabolical nature.¹³ Early modern Europeans believed that a physical deformation of the body was God’s punishment for an individual’s sinful thoughts and actions.¹⁴ Jennet’s testimony did not stop at accusing her mother of witchcraft. She also alleged that her brother used familiars for his witchcraft. In her accusation against her brother James Device, nine-year-old Jennet Device alleged that her brother’s familiar asked James “to giue him his Soule, and he should be reuenged of any whom hee would [desire].”¹⁵ Curiously, James’ pact with his familiar lacked the sexual implications present in other pacts with female witches, including the accused witches in this trial. This suggests that male accused witches were not accused based on their sexual desires like women seemed to be. In early modern Europe, women were seen as the more sexually voracious of the two sexes and, consequently, more susceptible to diabolic temptation than men.¹⁶ Device also lacked any place on his body for his familiar to suckle, which completely removed him from any sexual associations that women contended with because of their devil’s mark in later trials. By the 1620s, the devil’s mark was a fully

conceptualized piece of evidence that could be searched for on an accused witch’s body at trial. These physical manifestations were often referred to as “bigges or teates.” During her witchcraft trial held in London in 1621, the presiding judge ordered Elizabeth Sawyer’s body to be searched for devil’s marks. Sawyer was arraigned “vpon the complaints of the neighbours” who had long suspected her of witchcraft.¹⁷ However, the accusation against Sawyer was not made lightly. It often took decades of neighbors building up their distrust and suspicions before an accusation occurred. She was only brought to trial after the “long suspition of her” being a witch and “the information of her neighbours that dwelt about her” had built up enough to warrant an accusation.

Sawyer’s neighbors claimed that she had “a priuate and strange marke on her body” which warranted the full body search by women of “honest reputation.”¹⁸ One of the key evidentiary techniques of this trial, and many later trials, was searching the accused’s body for devil’s marks. In their search, the women found near her anus a “thing like a Teate... and seemed as though one had suckt it.”¹⁹ Unlike the “spots” on Francis and Waterhouse that were uncovered by their clothing in 1566, Sawyer’s devil’s mark was in a highly private location that never would have been discovered without the extensive bodily searching developed to find these marks. The discovery of Sawyer’s devil’s mark confirmed the jury’s suspicion that she was guilty of witchcraft and cemented their decision to convict her.²⁰ Sawyer’s conviction stemmed from the presence of her devil’s mark and her own admission to receiving help from the Devil.

After being convicted of using witchcraft in 1621, Elizabeth Sawyer was intensely questioned by Henry Goodcole, the chaplain of Newgate Prison in London. Sawyer had been convicted on charges of using “Diabolicall helpe” to kill nursing children, livestock, and murder Agnes Ratcliffe.²¹ Sawyer’s diabolical aid came in the form of a dog-shaped familiar whom she named Tom. In exchange for his aid, Sawyer claimed that Tom required her “Soule and body; and to seale this my promise made vnto him, I then gaue him leaue to sucke of my bloude, the which hee asked of me.”²² Unlike in Francis’ or Waterhouse’s exchange with their familiar in 1566, Sawyer’s familiar required her body, not just her blood, thus creating a sexual component to the relationship between familiar and witch. Along with her devil’s mark being located near her anus, the extra requirement of giving over her body implied a sexual relationship between the accused



witch and her familiar that was not present in 1566. A devil's mark near the anus would never be seen in public, unlike marks on the face and hands. The hidden nature of these marks required extensive and invasive bodily searching to discover them. During his questioning, Goodcole asked if Sawyer would "pull up your coates" when Tom showed up to feed on her.²³ Sawyer denied pulling up her petticoats, however, the sexual implication of Tom putting his head up her skirts to feed had been made. Sawyer also lacked the agency that Francis and Waterhouse claimed in their confession. She "willingly suffer[ed]" Tom feeding on her blood in a "place chosen by himself" indicating that Sawyer, like the accused witches in the 1612 Lancaster trial, took on a passive role in the transmission of blood.²⁴

The presence and sexual implications of Sawyer's mark confirmed the court's preconceived notions about Sawyer's character. Her accusers founded their testimonies on her ornery nature and proclivity towards cursing at them. Sawyer's crass nature, conflated with her physical deformities and devil's mark, all combined to make her vulnerable to a witchcraft accusation and conviction. However, as much as the presence of a devil's mark can confirm a guilty verdict, the lack of one can overturn it. At the 1634 Lancaster Assizes, at least nineteen people were accused and convicted of witchcraft on the testimony of ten-year-old Edmund Robinson in a trial discussed at the beginning of this paper. Curiously, one of the accused was Jennet Device, the young girl whose

testimony against her family aided in their conviction and execution in 1612. Robinson claimed that two of the accused took him to a gathering of witches at a new house in Pendle Forest called Hoarestones, where he saw "the number of three-score or thereabouts" feasting and drinking.²⁵ However, unbeknownst to the court, Robinson based his entire testimony on stories he had heard about the 1612 Lancaster trial to avoid being beaten by his mother for being out late.²⁶ Because the jury at Lancaster was likely also familiar with the events of the earlier trial, it was easy for them to accept Robinson's accusation as fact. Robinson's testimony convinced the jury to convict seventeen of the accused witches without examining them for devil's marks.²⁷ However, a suspicious judge wrote to King Charles I's Privy Council requesting that some of the convicted witches be searched for devil's marks.²⁸ As an intellectual of the Scientific Revolution, this judge required more evidence of witchcraft before he could rationalize executing seventeen people.

Charles I's Privy Council papers from June 29, 1634, reveal that some of the convicted witches were sent to London, where the King's surgeons made the "choice of midwives to inspect and search the bodies of those women lately . . . indicted for witchcraft."²⁹ On July 2, the royal surgeons and ten trusted midwives searched the bodies of Janet Hargraves, Frances Dicconson, and Mary Spencer, but they found "nothing unnatural nor anything like a teat or mark."³⁰ The lack of marks on their bodies ultimately saved the women's lives. Had a mark been found, the verdict from the Lancaster Assize Court would have been confirmed, and all seventeen of the accused would have been hanged for witchcraft. At this point in the witch trials, the evidentiary practice of searching the accused's body for devil's marks had become completely ingrained in the trial procedure.

By the beginning of the 1640s witch hunt, the reciprocal relationship between familiars and devil's marks had been fully integrated into the allegations of witchcraft. Searching the accused's body for devil's marks had become standard practice in English witch trials. In 1645, the Essex County Assize Court held a series of witch trials in Chelmsford, the home of the first witch trial in England. Of the thirty-three women listed in the 1645 Essex County Calendar of Prisoners in Gaol, almost all of them confessed to or were accused of associating with familiars.³¹ This statistic shows how integrated familiars had become within the witchcraft accusation narrative.

In one of the first trials of the assize court session,



Elizabeth Clarke of Manningtree admitted to having several familiars who would do her bidding and cause harm to her neighbors and their livestock. After being “watched,” or sleep-deprived, for several days, Clarke confessed to having had “carnall copulation with the Devill [for] six or seven years” in exchange for familiars that would do her bidding.³² Clarke’s sexual relations with the Devil highlights the gendered nature of the relationship between familiars and devil’s marks. Clarke also offered to “call one of her white impes” in front of Matthew Hopkins and John Stearne to prove their existence.³³ Clarke’s familiars supposedly appeared in the room and gave Sterne such a fright that he feared one of the toad-like familiars would have “got into his throate, and then there would have been a feast of toades in [his] belly.”³⁴ Clarke’s body was not searched for devil’s marks even though she admitted that her “impes did suck on her,” because her familiars appeared in a room full of witnesses whom all corroborated their testimonies. The appearance of her familiars, along with her admission to having sexual relations with the Devil, were enough to convict Clarke and hang her for witchcraft despite not being searched for devil’s marks.³⁵

Like Clarke, Margaret Moone of Thorpe offered to summon her familiars if one of her searchers, Francis Milles, brought her bread and beer during her watching period. Moone likely made this request to obtain food and drink, given the conditions of the prison and the high probability of scarce food supplies. Upon receiving the bread and beer, Moone “put the bread into the beere, and set it against a hole in the wall, and made a circle round about the pot, and then cried, ‘Come Christ, come Christ, come Mounsier, come

Mounsier.”³⁶ When the familiar did not appear to Moone and Milles, her body was searched for devil’s marks. Because the familiars did not appear for Moone in front of a witness, the prosecution lacked any tangible proof that Moone was a witch. Therefore, her body had to be searched for that proof.

As a female searcher, Francis Milles functioned as an expert witness regarding the proper form of a woman’s body. As a married woman, Milles’ expertise in the female form was specific enough to be able to identify the differences between what were considered devil’s marks and normal blemishes. Upon searching Moone’s body, Francis Milles “found three long teats or bigges in her secret parts, which seemed to have been lately sucked; and that they were not like Pyles, for this Informant knows well what they are, having been troubled with them her self.”³⁷ The discovery of devil’s marks and Moone’s confession of consorting with familiars was enough cause for the court to convict Moone and sentence her to the gallows.³⁸

During her trial at the Essex County Assize Court in 1645, Mary Greenleife of Alresford denied all accusations of witchcraft, even though devil’s marks had been found on her body by searchers.³⁹ Elizabeth Hunt and Priscilla Briggs examined Greenleife’s body and found “bigges or teates in her secret parts, not like emerods, nor in those places where women use to be troubled with them; and that they verily beleieve, these teates are sucked by her Impes.”⁴⁰ Greenleife claimed that “she never knew she had any such [devil’s marks] untill this time” contrary to the evidence given by her searchers.⁴¹ Even though Greenleife protested her innocence, the devil’s marks found on her body were proof enough to convict Greenleife of witchcraft.

However, before Greenleife could be executed; she died, likely of plague, due to the terrible conditions of the gaol a month after her examination.⁴²

In her trial at the Essex County Assize Court, Marian Hocket asserted her innocence but was still subjected to a bodily examination by Bridget Reynolds, who found that “Marian Hocket had no such bigges, but was found in the same parts, not like honest women.”⁴³ By implying that Hocket’s genitalia did not look like those of a respectable woman, Reynolds cast doubt on Hocket’s innocence, even though she had no devil’s marks. However, John Felgate testified that Sarah Barton, Hocket’s sister, told him that Hocket had “cut off her [devil’s marks], whereby she might have been more suspected to have been a witch, and laid plaisters to those places.”⁴⁴ By committing this act of self-mutilation, Marian Hocket demonstrates that defendants recognized the significance of devil’s mark evidence in witch trials. In order to evade conviction, one needed to avoid accusations that one possessed these physical manifestations of diabolic association. In Hocket’s case, however, her botched attempt to remove benign spots on her body brought even more suspicion upon her, as it appeared to be an attempt to avoid detection and to hide evidence. Her attempt to hide evidence coupled with Reynold’s assessment of her unrespectable genitalia led to Hocket’s conviction and execution.⁴⁵ The trials held at the Essex County Assize Court illustrated the culmination of the relationship between the accused’s identity, familiars, and devil’s marks in the English witch trials.

Through careful analysis of several trials, this paper has been able to prove the intersection between the accused witch’s physical appearance, reputation, and sexuality with the presence of a devil’s mark on their body. This research illuminated a point of intersection that has been referenced by historians, but never fully explored as its own entity. By exploring the relationship between the accused witch’s identity, her familiar, and her devil’s mark, this paper has proven that the development of the devil’s mark actively increased the number of convictions and subsequent executions during the 1640s witch hunt.

“A Man at Peace”

by Elise Bloom

On the Constancy of the Wise Person contains Seneca’s teaching about being unaffected by hardship. Seneca, a Roman Stoic, praises the wise man for maintaining his virtue and wellbeing amidst the tumult of life. Seneca uses the philosopher Stilpo as a dramatic example of constancy. Stilpo’s city was stormed and his life was – by all typical standards – ruined, yet he was seemingly unmoved by these calamities. Stilpo is even more striking when contrasted to Shakespeare’s character Hamlet. Hamlet serves as a foil to Stilpo, for Hamlet lacked constancy when pummeled by afflictions and found himself unable to maintain rational serenity. Contrasted with Hamlet’s turmoil, Stilpo’s endurance illustrates the benefits of constancy.

Stilpo faced great hardship. His city was conquered by Poliorcetes, who made himself king and interrogated Stilpo (Seneca 5.6). Furthermore, Stilpo’s daughters were captured, he knew not what they were facing, and he describes himself as being “old and alone” (6.5). When his city was taken, he lost every external good he possessed. His property was seized, his land ravaged, his house burnt down; every material item to his name was gone. Personally, he suffered severe injury. In Seneca’s account of the events, Stilpo says, “I crawled out from the ruins of my house, and with fires blazing all around me I fled the flames through a trail of blood”

(6.5). Not only did he lose his wealth and belongings, but he lost his family and country. One could scarcely choose worse circumstances to face, yet – according to Seneca – Stilpo recounts his tale indifferently.

A striking theme in Seneca’s narrative is Stilpo’s claim that he has lost nothing. When recounting his misfortunes, Stilpo’s attitude is stunning. He says, “all my things are with me. They will be with me” (5.6). Stilpo’s reasoning is that his only true possession is his mind. He views his material goods as being on loan: “For he had with him his real goods, which none can lay claim to, whereas those things that had been snatched away and scattered around and were being passed from hand to hand he judged to be not his but rather things that come and go at fortune’s beck and call” (5.7). By viewing material possessions as not being truly his, Stilpo detaches his wellbeing from their fate and remains immovable. Since Stilpo still has his reason, he says, “all my things are with me.” This claim is entirely counter to a common understanding of possessions. The very word “possessions” implies ownership of material goods. Seneca seems to assume that if a person loses that which is his, he will be shaken. By viewing his possessions as being on loan, Stilpo is unshaken when those possessions are taken from him. He is nearly unaffected by his loss, for he does not consider it to be a loss.

Seneca does qualify this detachment from material goods by saying that Stilpo “had



enjoyed [those things stolen from him], but not as his own, because the possession of things that flow in from outside is slippery and uncertain” (5.7). Seneca indicates that Stilpo chose to treat his material goods as being on loan because he could not be sure of permanently enjoying them. Do his goods truly not belong to him, or did he emotionally detach from his goods as a coping mechanism in the wake of disaster? Stilpo reasons that “he can bear hardships calmly and favorable conditions moderately” (6.3), remaining constant in his character regardless of his circumstances. A person cannot control whether fortune will bring material blessing or hardship. Stilpo sums up his philosophy of ownership, saying that a constant person “can think nothing to be his except himself – and even himself only in that part in which he is better,” namely, reason (6.3). A constant person views his only possession to be reason. His identity is found in wisdom alone; accordingly, he is unharmed when he undergoes calamity. Beyond suffering the loss of material possessions and family members, Stilpo undergoes the conquest of his country by enemies. Seneca writes, “amid swords flashing everywhere and the tumult of soldiers pillaging, amid the flames and blood and carnage of an overthrown city, amid the crash of temples falling down on their gods, one man was at peace” (6.2). Stilpo stole the triumph of his enemies, the triumph of superiority that is sought by all who injure and insult. Seneca writes, “Stilpo wrested [Poliorcetes’] victory from him by testifying that although his city had been captured, he was not only unconquered but actually unscathed” (5.7). Constancy makes the wise man tough, unable to be truly defeated. Stilpo’s detachment from his material goods is advantageous because it enables him to manage hardship. Nevertheless, his viewpoint is more startling when applied to his relationship with his daughters.

Describing the sacking of his city, Stilpo says, “As for the fate my daughters met, whether it was worse than our public fate, I do not know. Old and alone, and seeing only enemies around me, I nevertheless declare that my assets are intact and unharmed. Whatever I had that was mine, I have and hold” (6.6). He calls them his daughters, and he refers to his people’s fate, then he says that his assets are unscathed. Though he describes his daughters, his people, and his assets as all being his, he must mean that there are multiple ways in which something can belong to a person. Though his daughters are his by way of fathering them, ultimately the only thing that belongs to him is himself. Accordingly, his account betrays no emotion regarding his daughters’ suffering. He enjoyed them while they were part of his life, but now that they are gone, he will continue without turmoil, as a complete person in possession of everything he owns. This hardness of spirit is certainly useful, but it denies emotional attachment to one’s own family, which is a fundamental aspect of human nature. Seneca’s account of constancy suggests that there are no appropriate emotions of sorrow and love. Love would drive Stilpo to protect his daughters, seeking their good to the furthest extent possible. Seneca diminishes human emotion by his esteem for constancy in the tale of Stilpo. Viewing reason as supremely good, Stilpo forsakes care for others so that he may preserve his state of mind. Stilpo’s country was devastated, yet he was “at peace” (6.2). Stilpo’s constancy enables him to think rationally, yet that same quality undermines his motivation to fight in defense of his family and city. When Seneca says that “those things that had been snatched away and scattered around ... [Stilpo] judged not to be his but rather things that come and go at fortune’s beck and call,” his country must be included (5.7). Seneca admires devotion to one’s country, yet he praises Stilpo, who was unphased by the destruction of his country. Presumably, if one’s country is good, then there would be an appropriate anger at its

destruction. Seneca praises the “peace” of Stilpo because it is the result of his wisdom and constancy. For Stilpo, the good at which everything aims is constancy. Accordingly, there is no righteous anger on behalf of one’s country and family. While constancy is technically only a part of virtue, the wise man’s staunch constancy seems to eradicate virtues involving other loyalties. The wise man overcomes his enemies by his impenetrable walls of virtue (6.8). Stilpo was not humiliated; his masters did not change (6.6); he lost nothing (6.1); he was “unconquered and unscathed” (6.4); he was “at peace” (6.2), because he had a “well-founded mind” (6.4). Perhaps Seneca overdramatizes Stilpo to emphasize the benefits of constancy. Stilpo says, “Just now I crawled out from the ruins of my house, and with fires blazing all around me I fled the flames through a trail of blood” (6.5). He unemotionally reports this vivid drama, supposedly conveying his immediate disposition toward hardship and suffering. Seneca uses the caricature of Stilpo to teach a lesson. Highlighting Stilpo’s age, Seneca appeals to the wisdom that years of reflection ought to bring. An old man, Stilpo’s death was imminent (6.1); regardless of conquering enemies, he would soon leave behind material possessions and close family members. Thus, with the perspective of old age, he has developed apathy toward those possessions and people. By contrast, other people in Stilpo’s city are controlled by love of money, paralyzed by material losses, and “flee from the enemy with their pockets weighed down” (6.7). The constant man stands out from the hordes of



people whose priorities are misaligned, which makes them weak. Seneca commands his audience to “consider whether a thief, a defamer, an insolent neighbor, or some wealthy man lording it like a king over Stilpo’s destitute old age could do an injury to this man,” when war “could wrest nothing away from him” (6.1). Stilpo’s constancy – a direct result of wisdom – made him unconquerable.

Stilpo’s welfare seems to be completely impenetrable; his steadfast character is all the more evident when contrasted to the mental state of other people. Seneca’s virtue of constancy enables men to cope with what Shakespeare calls the “slings and arrows of outrageous fortune” (Hamlet III.1). This line from Shakespeare’s Hamlet alludes to an overarching theme of that play; Hamlet found himself in dire need of withstanding misfortune. In the opening act of the play, Hamlet is introduced just after his father, the king of Denmark, has died. Though Hamlet was the rightful heir to his father, his Uncle Claudius has usurped the throne. The ghost of Hamlet’s father appears to Hamlet, revealing that Claudius murdered Hamlet’s father; furthermore, Claudius is sleeping with Hamlet’s mother, Gertrude. After confirming the treachery of Claudius, the ghost implores Hamlet to revenge his father’s murder and humiliation. Hamlet pursues vengeance against his uncle as tragedy enfolds everyone in the court. Hamlet faces a splintered state and family life. His Uncle Claudius is responsible for deposing Denmark’s ruler and destroying Hamlet’s family. Claudius banishes Hamlet to England for a time, with the intention of having Hamlet killed there. Hamlet has no home or security. Overwhelmed by the treachery of his uncle, Hamlet contemplates suicide as a means of escape. He seeks relief from “a weary life,” but “the dread of something after death” stays his hand. He ponders whether he ought to continue suffering hardship in life or end his suffering by death: “take arms against a sea of troubles / And by opposing end them.” Hamlet views life and misfortune as being inextricably intertwined. He chronicles the wrongs people suffer in life and says that the thing keeping people from escaping their troubles by suicide is the “dread of something after death.” He equates this dread with conscience, yet he seems to wish that he was strong enough to seize the path of action and of death.

Thus conscience does make cowards of us all,
And thus the native hue of resolution
Is sickled o’er with the pale cast of thought,
And enterprises of great pitch and moment
With this regard their currents turn awry

And lose the name of action. (III.1.91-96)

Fear prevents Hamlet from escaping the hardships of life through suicide. The way he frames his decision – action or passivity, suicide or suffering – reveals his fragility. Bound by the intrigue and fear which surround him, Hamlet reveals that he is a slave to fortune.

Framed by chaos, virtue has an element of constancy, according to Shakespeare. When the ghost narrates the relationship between Claudius and Hamlet's mother Gertrude, he describes Gertrude as only a "most seeming-virtuous queen" (I.5.53). If Gertrude's love was truly virtuous, she would not have returned the lust of Claudius; she would have stayed true to her husband, who was murdered by Claudius. The ghost even says that "virtue ... will never be moved / Though lewdness court it in a shape of heaven" (I.5.60-61). By joining herself to Claudius, Gertrude reveals that her love was never true. While Shakespeare portrays true love as constant, nevertheless love entangles people. Throughout the play, revenge and love are intertwined. The ghost appeals to Hamlet's love for his father as he urges Hamlet to get revenge on Claudius. Hamlet feels obligated to avenge his father and to end the evil Claudius is perpetuating. He says,

Is 't not perfect conscience

To quit him with this arm? And is 't not to be damned

To let this canker of our nature come

In further evil? (V.5.75-80)

Hamlet and Claudius are both determined to kill the other, though they have different motives. Hamlet is burdened by the quest of avenging his father, while Claudius considers Hamlet to be a threat to his rule. Just as Seneca says that all those who injure and insult are trying to attain superiority, Claudius aims to kill Hamlet because he feels threatened by Hamlet. Thus, Claudius's desire to murder Hamlet reveals his weakness.

Ultimately, Claudius challenges Hamlet to a duel with Laertes, one of Claudius's courtiers. Before the fight, Hamlet expresses concern over the possibility of dying; nevertheless, he acknowledges that eventual death is inevitable. Laertes brings a poisoned sword to the duel; in the case that Hamlet is not killed by Laertes' blade, Claudius has prepared a poisoned drink for Hamlet, which Hamlet's mother unintentionally consumes. During the fight, Laertes and Hamlet swap swords, so both men are stabbed by the poisoned blade. After being wounded, Hamlet manages to kill Claudius with both the poisoned sword and drink. Hamlet kills Claudius but dies in the process. As he lies dying, he expresses relief for his struggle being over. He refers to life as "this harsh world" and to death as "felicity" (V.2.382). The tragic ending to this play

reveals that Hamlet had been swept along in the violence and suspicion of the whole court.

Though Hamlet seeks to act honorably and remain loyal to his father, he seems to be at the mercy of his tragic circumstances. He nearly succumbs to madness and ultimately dies in his quest for revenge. In his suffering, there are several parallels to themes in *On Constancy*, including revenge and misfortune. Hamlet was entangled in anger and revenge. Seneca asserts that the wise person will not seek revenge, for doing so would elevate the one who attempted injury to an equal level. The wise person is so far above those who seek to gain by injury and insult that he has no need to respond to them (Seneca 14.2). Seneca does allow for revenge, but only as a means of correction, not as personal vengeance (12.3). Hamlet's revenge was primarily driven by love and anger, which were notably lacking in Stilpo. Thus, Shakespeare and Seneca – through opposite examples – reveal that love for others does entangle people's hearts. Love for others makes one vulnerable to the injuries that they experience. This same love can drive quests of revenge. Though righteous anger seems fitting, Stilpo appears entirely unconcerned with the fate of his city and his daughters. As a supreme objective, constancy necessarily undermines loyalty to other things like life, family, and country. Rather than being an example to be emulated, Stilpo serves as a response to people who think that constancy is too high a goal for which to strive (6.3). Because Stilpo is extreme, he counteracts the protest that constancy is too hard; he lost everything imaginable yet remained constant.

It is a rare and valuable thing to cope reasonably with difficult circumstances, which are inevitable. Seneca contends that it is possible to rise above the raging seas of this life. The wise man is untouched by insults and injuries. He has made himself into the sole source of his joys, and separated himself from external things so that he does not live an unsettled life (19.2). The wise man always acts rationally and is free from anxiety (13.5), for he has a perfectly composed mind. Seneca writes that "fortune defeats us unless our defeat of it is total" (15.3); against the wise man, "fortune has no power at all" (19.4). Hamlet was unable to defeat fortune, so – in Seneca's view – fortune defeated him. The deception seeping through the court led to Hamlet battling against himself and suspecting those around him. By contrast, Stilpo serves as an amplified standard of the security that constancy provides. The wise man's constancy enables him to maintain virtue and peace, unhindered by the whims of fortune.

“A Reason for Benevolence: Exploring Hume’s Views on Human Reason”

by Samuel Clarke

Throughout history, philosophers have distinguished between human beings and the rest of the natural world primarily on the basis of capacity to reason. Where man is capable of existential thought—Aristotle called it “*logos*”—other beings can only use reason instrumentally. Put more simply, humans can ask questions about their own existence, but animals are limited to using reason in order to obtain what they want or need. Consequently, the consensus among many philosophers has been that humans form their convictions inductively; they draw general, logical conclusions from observing specific phenomena. For millennia, great thinkers have built their philosophical, moral, economic, and scientific theories upon this premise. David Hume, on the other hand, doubted human capacity in this regard. In fact, he argues fervently against this

presupposition in *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, his second major work. He contends, “No conclusion can be more agreeable to skepticism than such as make discoveries concerning the weakness and narrow limits of human reason and capacity” (Hume, 7.59). Hume believed that while humans possess some limited ability to think inductively, very few of our leading convictions are motivated by a thorough examination of fact; our feelings have a much more significant influence over us. Furthermore, he argued that if people could learn to accept this idea, they would find themselves, both individually and collectively, far happier and more content than if they denied it. The semantic distinction between human “reason” and “rationality” has been poorly established in philosophical literature. While it is generally agreed that humans possess various faculties of thinking, philosophers have lacked consistency in

choosing terms to differentiate between these faculties. Plato addresses the human mind in *The Republic* using his “divided line” analogy that depicts a single line with four segments, each of which essentially represent the human ability to think more metaphysically.

Augustine’s *On the Trinity* distinguishes between a “higher” and “lower” reason, the former allowing for abstract contemplation while the latter serves an instrumental purpose (Book 12, Ch. 3). In *A Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant characterizes the mind as possessing two faculties, “sensibility” and “understanding,” which delineate externally and internally motivated thought (Sellars 1967). However, no single pair of terms has ever been officially adopted in academia. John Uebersax points out in his article “Higher Reason” that Western philosophers’ lack of consistency when it comes to assigning terms to “higher” and “lower” reason has caused the word “reason” itself to become ambiguous (2013).

Nevertheless, the general conclusion reached by Western philosophy is that human thought exists in two realms: a lower realm, which denotes inductive, instrumental thought and a higher realm, which represents abstract, metaphysical thought (Uebersax). The resulting question that has sharply divided philosophers is whether the higher realm of thought, is, in and of itself, a source of knowledge and conviction. This became the fundamental distinction between Rationalism and Empiricism. On one hand, rationalists preached that knowledge can be achieved for those who train their minds to be as logical as possible and prevent their feelings from obstructing logical thought. René Descartes, for instance, was a fervent proponent of the power of human reason, arguing that any philosophical premise that is not completely rational or based soundly on logic ought to be rejected. He says in the opening remarks for his unfinished work *The Search for Truth by Natural Light*, “I shall bring to light the true riches of our souls opening up to each of us the means whereby we confined within ourselves without any help from anyone else all the knowledge that we may need for the conduct of life” (as qtd in Mullin 2002). On the other hand, Hume, an empiricist, goes to great lengths in his writings to maintain that humans lack any such “means,” characterizing reason in *A Treatise of Human Nature* as “nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls, which carries us along a certain train of ideas, and endows them with particular qualities, according to their particular situations and relations” (Hume, 1.3.16). While Hume never denies that humans have the ability to contemplate abstract



ideas, the fact that these ideas will inevitably intersect with irrational human sentiment impedes their ability to discern truth outside of real experience. He mentions later that “reason is perfectly inert and can never either prevent or produce any action or affection” (Hume, 3.1.1).

Hume also devoted a great deal of time to addressing what motivates the human will. For Hume, volition is wholly irrational and determined entirely by emotion.

He insists in *A Treatise of Human Nature*:

Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them. [...]

Nothing can oppose or retard the impulse of passion, but a contrary impulse; and if this contrary impulse ever arises from reason, that latter faculty must have an original influence on the will, and must be able to cause, as well as hinder any act of volition. (Hume, 2.3.3)

Hume pointed to human morality as evidence of this unconscious but involuntary human proclivity. He was not religious and saw no cause for rationally-driven beings to be compassionate or act mercifully. It is only their empathetic and sensitive nature that drives them to behave in this manner. Hume does, however, point

out that this higher realm of thought can manifest itself in two forms, which he terms “demonstration” and “probability.”

Hume defines “demonstration” as “the abstract relations of our ideas, or those relations of objects, of which experience only gives us information” (2.3.3). He says: Reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood. Truth or falsehood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact. Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible of this agreement or disagreement, is incapable of being true or false, and can never be an object of our reason. Now it is evident our passions, volitions, and actions, are not susceptible of any such agreement or disagreement; being original facts and realities, complete in themselves, and implying no reference to other passions, volitions, and actions. It is impossible, therefore, they can be pronounced either true or false, and be either contrary or conformable to reason. (2.1.1) Here, Hume is describing intuitive knowledge that one acquires through human experience. For instance, a person does not need to employ reason in order to determine that, if they leap from a building, they will fall. While reason might assist them in deciding whether or not to jump, they do not need to use reason to determine whether or not gravity exists. In other words, understanding causality does not constitute reason. Hume points out that “demonstrations may be difficult to be comprehended, because of abstractedness of the subject, but can never have such difficulties as will weaken their authority, once they are comprehended” (2.3.3). That is to say, the complexity of the subject has no bearing on whether or not it is a demonstration. Understanding calculus, for instance, might require a great deal of contemplative thought, but obtaining a comprehension of it does not require reason; it is simply the observation of an

empirical truth.

The second manifestation of reason Hume refers to as “probability.”

Understanding the power of probability is key to grasping Hume’s philosophy. He says:

It is obvious that when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity and are carried to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction. [...] Here then reasoning takes place to discover this relation; and according as our reasoning varies, our actions receive a subsequent variation. But it is evident in this case that the impulse arises not from reason, but is only directed by it. It is from the prospect of pain or pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises towards any object. [...] Reason is nothing but the discovery of this connexion. (Hume, 2.3.3)

This idea represents a microcosm of Hume’s philosophy on human reason. Essentially, we will be motivated to act or not to act based on whether we expect that the action itself will lead to pleasure or pain. While this might appear to be a “rational” strategy for decision-making, Hume points out that our decisions are still based on emotion. To recycle the previous example, a person may choose to leap or choose to not leap from a building. Choosing to not jump, upon evaluation that the action is not worth its consequence, does not constitute a rational decision. The true, underlying motivation is not a rational assessment of the action and its consequences but a fear of hitting the ground. Conversely, if a person decides to do something, it must be because they anticipate that the action will bring them pleasure. If a person chooses to smoke a cigarette, it will not be because they have weighed the pros and cons of smoking and have thus

come to a rational decision; rather, their desire to smoke the cigarette overpowers their fear of the negative effects it might have on their body. Fear, curiosity, disgust, gratitude, anger, joy, sadness, and love are the true sources of human volition. It is not reason but emotion that serves as the true impetus for action.

Hume spent much of his life preaching that refusal to accept this reality of human nature causes people to be less content. In *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, he says:

Do you follow the instincts and propensities of nature, may they say, in assenting to the veracity of sense? Do you disclaim this principle, in order to embrace a more rational opinion, that the perceptions are only representations of something external? You hear ‘depart from your natural propensities and more obvious sentiments;’ and yet are not able to satisfy your reason, which can never find any convincing argument from experience to prove, that the perceptions are connected with any external objects.

(Hume, 12.121)

Hume believed that denying these “natural propensities” and “obvious sentiments” makes people less happy. He even found himself more content by practicing this in his own life, saying, “Most fortunately it happens, that since Reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, Nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium” (Hume, 1.4.7). Hume was convinced that many of the world’s problems arise from society being centered around what we want to be—rational beings—rather than what we are—creatures driven by feeling and emotion. Thus, he proposed that people ought to rethink their

interactions with others and cultivate a social atmosphere that is better suited towards emotionally-driven people. David Hume’s ideas had a profound influence over many who came after him. While the notion that humans are inherently irrational beings might seem somewhat bleak and no doubt antithetical to the philosophies of many other great thinkers, Hume found a great deal of comfort in coming to terms with it. He did not consider this worldview to be a harsh reality to accept with reluctance but rather a sobering realization that one might as well embrace. According to Hume, acknowledging that humans are nothing more than complex animals should not promote cynicism but encourage benevolence.

Regardless of what implication this has on our understanding of human nature, Hume’s skepticism towards reason challenged many of the fundamental assumptions made by ancient and enlightenment thinkers surrounding the human will.

“Russian Rock and the Search for National Identity: Understanding Post-Soviet and Contemporary Russia Through the Evolution of Rock”

by Brigid Alois



There is perhaps no better framework for understanding the identity crisis of the post-Soviet generation than the influence of rock music. Rock music first entered the Russian stage as a unique hinge between soviet counterculture and the strong Russian lyrical tradition heralded by the poems of Aleksandr Pushkin and early Russian lyricists. Beginning in the sixties in Soviet Russia, rock music was placed in a delicate position. In *Back in the U.S.S.R.: The True Story of Rock in Russia*, Artemy Troitsky discusses the rise of rock through a shocking negotiation between two entirely opposing parties: the leaders of Russian rock and the KGB (72). The Rock Club developed in 1981 as an official compromise between the KGB, the dictators of Russian culture, and the leaders of the Leningrad rock community, the authorities on Russian counterculture (73). During the peak of the Soviet era, KGB officers grew tired of their attempts to sniff out and shut down hundreds of unofficial concerts that were nearly impossible to locate and relied entirely on word of mouth (Maynes 1). The leaders of the Russian underground rock community were experts at organizing these illicit concerts right under the noses of the KGB. However, these rockers were quite interested in establishing a more stable rock community. Leningrad Rock leaders needed official recognition and fame for their Leningrad rockers. Without such

recognition, rock music would remain trapped underground, threatening the survival of the music industry under the persistent gaze of the KGB. The conflict between the organizers of these concerts and the KGB turned to a stalemate, with both groups eager for a solution. The birth of the Leningrad rock club became the official compromise, one that would undoubtedly work to the benefit of the Russian rock community far more than that of the KGB.

The Soviet Rock Clubs provided individuals with a taste of self-expression that was virtually nonexistent in any other facet of Soviet Russia. Troitsky writes, "Young people for the first time felt the right to their own, independent self-expression" (24). The birth of the Leningrad Rock Club was a powerful opportunity for the Russian rock community, one that would cause future rockers to thank their predecessors for negotiating deals with the Soviet police. After the collapse of the Soviet era, rockers used their new freedom and fame to write and sing about the trauma of post-Soviet Russia, with listeners responding enthusiastically to their lyrics. With all the struggles and problems surrounding the collapse of the Soviet Union, rock music created an outlet for individuals to feel comforted and heard by their favorite heroes. Rock concerts became the sacred sites of Russian culture and counterculture, and the musicians were anointed as the high priests of non-conformity and self-expression.

In order to understand the significance of rock music on the post-Soviet youth, one must first understand the complex identity crisis they faced. The post-Soviet era was a time of severe political and social turmoil in Russia. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 uprooted the nation. In *The Patriotism of Despair: Nation, War, and Loss in Russia*, Serguei Oushakine writes, "Usually framed as a 'period of transition,' the 1990s were quickly dubbed by Russians as the time of *bespredel*, a word that means a lack of any visible obstacles or limits but also an absence of any shared rules or laws" (Oushakine 1). While the nineties introduced to Russia a significant amount of political and economic freedom, this freedom was coupled with a complete lack of knowledge or guidance for exercising it. The government removed countless economic regulations and price controls, ushering in a period of panic and severe inflation. The Soviet people were left wondering how and why this powerful system had suddenly abandoned them. For a nation of individuals who had relied on the guidance of the state for their entire lives, freedom was synonymous with chaos and instability. The introduction of capitalism to Russia was coupled

with powerful corruption and instability. Capitalism lent itself to "gangster capitalism," a political and social system run by mob bosses who acted in the place of state institutions. Lawlessness and crime allowed the mob to offer itself as both tax collector and protector of ordinary individuals (Rampton 8). This phenomenon imparted a backwards moral code, making matters better and worse at the same time. As a result of this new economic and political system, morality and justice remained undefined and ambiguous terms.

Young people in particular suffered from these new changes. They struggled with the search for an individual and national identity, out of touch with their Soviet predecessors and ill-prepared for an understanding of their new identity. Soviet Russia dismissed the topic of "Russian-ness" and hid its lack of an ideological identity under a collective "Sovietness" (Oushakine 10). Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, "Sovietness" was the only identity known to the Russian people. When Soviet society collapsed, individuals made a desperate dive to maintain the only identity known to them as a community. Oushakine identifies two outcomes of this loss of identity. The first outcome Oushakine deems a "community of loss," where individuals formed a relationship out of a shared trauma and despair. The unique experience of "Sovietness" was an identity for Russians at this time. The "community of loss" refers to a community of trauma, trauma from Soviet Russia, the collapse, and the aftermath of their mental and physical experiences. Oushakine writes, "The patriotism of despair, as I call it, emerged...to mediate relations among individuals, nation, and state and thus to provide communities of loss with socially meaningful subject positions" (5, 7). The second outcome of this identity crisis was the rise of ethnic prejudices in the post-Soviet era, largely as a response to the absence of an understanding of one's ethnic identity during the Soviet period (7, 142). Soviet Russia made no effort to understand or express the multiethnic background of the region, instead homogenizing the people under a collective "Sovietness" (7). After the collapse, many young people sought to understand their ethnic background and link it to an essential "Russianness." Young adults during the post-Soviet era were placed in a complicated position. These individuals grew up with little to no instruction in morality and personal development. Their parents were products of Soviet Russia, and they could not impart the necessary tools for the free world to their children. The collapse of the Soviet Union dumped the task of personal development on these youth. Thus, thinking for oneself became the

task of young people who were never taught how to do so.

Rock music presented the Soviet people with an opportunity for understanding themselves and their Russian identity. As previously discussed, Russian rock music was nearly the only legitimate outlet for self-expression during the Soviet era. After the collapse, the new social and political freedom only added to its former success. With growing frustration from the political and economic crises of the era, young people throughout the nation found a voice in the heartfelt words of their revolutionary rock heroes. Oushakine reflects, "If the post-Soviet period can teach us anything, it is, perhaps, that during times of comprehensive social and political transformation culture matters more than ever" (3). Rock music in Russia verifies this claim, shedding light on the reality of the passion and struggles of the Russian people.

Sometimes I think we're heroes,

Backs to the wall, Afraid of no one;

Sometimes I think we're just dirt - "Heroes" by Aquarium

Russian rock music should be understood as a bridge between the "community of loss" described by Oushakine and the individual self. Oushakine reflects, "otchaianie, the Russian-language equivalent for "despair," means lost hope and dejection but also decisiveness and courage without any constraints" (6). The music encourages the heroism of the Russian people, but also reflects on their trauma and pain. Russian rock commiserates while simultaneously encouraging the Russian people on their search for an identity within their homeland.

But if there is, in my pocket,

a pack of cigarettes,

Then everything isn't so bad, after all,

today. - "A Pack of Cigarettes" by Kino

The potency of Russian rock lyrics is particularly strong among the Russian youth. After all, what gets young people more excited than commiserating over a pack of cigarettes? The young men and women of the post-Soviet era were responsible for defining the new Russia and surviving the destabilizing effects of so-called "gangster capitalism." These individuals hoped to define a new Russia amidst the wreckage of the collapse of the Soviet Union, seeking strength and encouragement amid their struggles. Rock music bent itself to this task, answering to the interests of the youth in their own fundamental "Russianness" as well as non-conformity and political activism. The concept of duty is incredibly important in Russian historical

tradition, and uniquely tied to the search for identity among post-soviet youth. This sense of duty is present in the protests and political activism of young Russians and the lyrics of many of their most beloved rock songs. Bands and musicians such as Kino, Nautilus, and Aquarium, spoke to the difficulty of the future leaders of post Soviet Russia, indicating that social and political change would soon be inevitable and that these young adults would be the heralds of such change.

Earlier we had time

Now we have things to do

(we need to) prove

That the strong is devouring the weak

To prove that soot is white - "Wings," Nautilus Pompilius

The film *Brother* provides a powerful insight into the moral development of a young Russian man in the wake of the collapse of Soviet Russia, and the power of Russian rock in his own development. The flawed hero, Danila, demonstrates the complex moral system present in many young people in the post-Soviet era. Surrounded by lawlessness and freedom, young people adopted a variety of moral codes and values. With no adults to teach them how to think, they created moral systems and identities for themselves. Danila is the product of this social dilemma. Danila spends much of the film in search of the album "Wings" by the famous band, Nautilus Pompilius. The band's songs are featured as the soundtrack of the film, placing the band within the film and providing aesthetic support to the film's themes. When Danila enters the record store in search of Nautilus' album, the clerk tells him it is sold out. The popularity of the music among young Russians is clearly addressed here. Nautilus Pompilius was known for its powerful lyrics, inspiring individuals to pursue political freedom and self-expression. In the lyrics from their smash hit "Wings," Nautilus identifies the primary struggle of men like Danila. They sing *We need to prove that/ The strong are devouring the weak*. The lyrics make a strong allusion to the suffering of many Russians under the quasi-capitalist system of the post-Soviet era. The call to action posed by the line "we need to prove" indicates an important aspect of the relationship between rock and the Russian youth. Russian rock itself is a call to action. While the music rarely contains moral messages for the listener, there is a strong attachment to duty and action present in many of the songs. This sense of duty can be both problematic and inspirational. The music made leaders and brave individuals out of the listeners and followers of Russian rock music, but avoided imparting a specific moral code to them.

Danila is an example of this flawed leadership. He is



interested in the protection of ethnic Russians, and is openly willing to protect some ethnic groups and not others. His ethnic prejudices are prominent in the film, despite his desire to protect and ensure the safety of those around him. In “Are You Gangsters? ‘No, We’re Russians’: The Brother Films and the Question of National Identity in Russia,” Vanessa Rampton highlights the similarity between the Russian bogatyr, or knight-class, and Danila. Danila is the modern bogatyr, a flawed vigilante responsible for administering justice within a chaotic and upside-down world (15). Rampton connects the surge in right-wing political movements and racial prejudice with frustrations about Russian national identity and the absence of a defined sense of personhood (10). Despite Danila’s exclusive justice system, the filmmaker places Danila in the position of hero and protagonist throughout the film. According to Rampton, the filmmaker, Aleksei Balabanov, stresses the importance of withholding judgments of Danila’s sense of justice. While critics often condemn Balabanov’s silence on Danila’s prejudices, many view his silence as a statement on the irresolvable problems of national identity in contemporary Russia (11). Danila definitely operates within a sideways moral code, but his vague notion of right and wrong should be viewed positively. Despite his problematic exclusivity, Danila is motivated by a notion of duty that approaches a moralistic code. The development of any personal moral code at all should be the focus here. This personal set of

values and morals is new for Danila, as it was for nearly all young people throughout post-Soviet Russia. Danila represents an important step in the development of a national and individual “selfhood” among the post Soviet youth, with Rock music front and center in its creation. Throughout *Brother*, Danila is literally moved by the music, with each song signaling a new scene in the film. The music metaphorically supports Danila, offering him strength and comfort in his search for identity and purpose in a time of social and political turmoil. The lyrics are intentionally vague enough to provide room for interpretation, but salient enough for Danila and the individuals he represents to find meaning in them. Russian rock distinguishes itself from Western rock through the Russian lyrical tradition present in the music of bands like Nautilus. Academic poetry and poetic tradition are essential aspects of Russian culture and heritage, and this is clearly reflected in the use of careful metaphors and references embedded in Russian rock music (Troitsky 41). Deeply revered poets and lyricists are the predecessors of these artists, and rock musicians remain firmly attached to their legacy. Artemy Troitsky’s book connects the Russian lyrical tradition to the unique nature of Russian rock. Troitsky argues that more value is placed in the ideas of the song and the lyrics have a more important role than lyrics in Western rock, creating a genre of rock culture that is distinctly “Russian” (Troitsky 40). A strong stigma against disorder and senseless behavior remains within the rock community. Despite

being kings and queens of non-conformity and counterculture, rock musicians recognize their roots in the Russian lyrical tradition and are dutifully respectful of their role as artists and performers. Troitsky remarks that when the lead guitarist of Aquarium laid down on his back and began playing his guitar at the 1980 Tbilisi Festival, the judging committee of the concert walked out, as if they were saying “We bear no responsibility for the performance of such hooligans” (Troitsky 58). The Russian lyrical and poetic background maintains a strict standard for Russian artists, demanding a sense of solemnity from musicians. As Troitsky points out, these rockers are artists, not hooligans. Similarly, the young survivors of the collapse of Soviet Russia were not hooligans, extremists, or criminals, they were the inexperienced builders of a new Russia. This distinction is crucial for young Russians like Danila. Despite the unorthodox features of their heroism, they are serious about their desire to protect and support the Russian people. And those who are weak, they live from drink to drink

They cry: “They don’t let us sing!”

They cry: “You just can’t sing here!”

But we are marching-we are strong and full of energy.

Our frozen fingers strike the matches

That will light big fires. “We Want

Changes” -Kino (1986)

Rock music remains a primary feature of non-conformist artistic culture in Russia today. In 2012, the all-female rock group “Pussy Riot” was arrested for performing anti-Putin songs in a Russian cathedral. In the documentary *Pussy Riot: A Punk Prayer*, members of the group spoke out against the oppressive nature of Putin’s rule. They defended their choice to perform in a cathedral as a commentary on the corrupt dealings between the Orthodox church and the state. They acknowledged the offensiveness of their

act, but argued that it was a necessary provocation of the state. The group received enormous press from an international audience. Their trial was exposed to the world, and unveiled significant corruption in the Russian legal system. Carrying on the role of modern “bogatyri,” these women acted outside the legal system in order to enact change. These heroes continue to fight the same problems found in the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. They understand themselves as dutiful successors to the “bogatyri” who came before them. These women remain serious about their role in Russian politics and identity. They do not see themselves as hooligans or criminals, they are actors in a historical movement. Questions of the moral integrity of their actions and their understanding of true justice remain unanswered. However, despite the moral ambiguity of their actions, these women are undoubtedly responsible for “striking the matches that will light big fires.” Rock music remains the primary vehicle for self-expression and cultural identity for young people and non-conformists. Roman Karetnikov of the group “Nobody’s Home” told NPR, “It’s the cathedral of the Russian underground” (Maynes). Maynes notes that the lyrics of Kino’s “We Want Change” are still being played in protests in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, with crowds shouting the chorus: “Change demands our hearts, Change demands our eyes, We’re waiting for change.” Rock is a sanctuary for the rebel heroes and the non-conformists. While these rebels are often morally flawed and complicated individuals, they possess a unique and powerful penchant for inspiring the people of Russia and encouraging their right to individual self-expression.

“A Digital Age: Where Does Social Media Fall Under the Constitution?”

by Meghan Hart



As society progresses, digital means of communication, such as social media platforms, have become ubiquitous in daily life. With the popularity of social media rapidly increasing, more claims have been made of Constitutionally-protected free speech being obstructed by these platforms. When addressing these allegations, it is important to note that the Constitution does protect individual rights to expression from local, state, and federal government infringement. It does not protect these freedoms against the actions of private entities, including social media companies. This government versus private entity distinction is commonly referred to as the “state-action requirement” (Epstein et al., 2022, pp. 548-49; Legal Information Institute, n.d.). With the emergence of digital communications, the government has had more opportunities to be involved in the activities of social media platforms, complicating the application of the state-action requirement. If an individual claims that their free speech has been violated by a social media company, the Court should follow an analytical and evidence-based approach to decide if government involvement in that company’s actions is substantial enough to warrant Constitutional protection.

The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances” (Epstein et al., 2022, p. 683).

Approaching the Bill of Rights from a textualist perspective, it is overt that the First Amendment’s protection of free speech applies to Congressional legislative activity. The Constitution does not indicate that private entities are included under this protection. Therefore, the hindrance of free speech by private entities is not prohibited by the Constitution. This concept is a foundation of the state-action requirement, which is often referenced to in cases and controversies involving free speech protections. The state-action requirement is rooted in the provisions of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. As previously mentioned, the First Amendment prohibits Congress from establishing a law that “abridg[es] the freedom of speech” (Epstein et al., 2022, p. 683). The Fourteenth Amendment further clarifies the Constitutional protection of speech and expands its applicability to the states through the Privileges and Immunities Clause and Due Process Clause. Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment proclaims “...No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws” (Epstein et al., 2022, p. 684-85). The U.S. judicial system has often regarded the provisions of these Amendments as only applying to “State,” or governmental, action, and not to those of private entities like businesses. This is the approach taken by the state-action requirement in regards to Constitutional applicability (Ayoub, 1984).

The state-action requirement has been applied in several Supreme Court cases, including the *Civil Rights Cases* in 1883 (*Civil Rights Cases*, 1883; Oyez Editors, n.d.). The cases sought to delineate the scope of the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the ruling, the majority decided that the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment applied only to State actions and not to those of private entities, such as businesses serving the public. Justice Harlan, foreshadowing future judicial challenges, disagreed with the rigid distinction between government versus private entities (*Civil Rights Cases*, 1883; Oyez Editors, n.d.). He noted that private companies’ operations can

be conducted in correspondence with the government’s prerogatives, and in these instances private companies should be subject to Constitutional limits. A similar argument is commonly brought up in present cases that concern social media companies’ correspondence with the government regarding policies on limiting free speech, and whether Constitutional protections can be applied to such. Although Justice Harlan asserted a more flexible interpretation of government involvement, the majority in the *Civil Rights Cases* (1883) adhered to the state-action requirement’s rigid stance of not applying Constitutional protections against the actions of private entities (*Civil Rights Cases*, 1883; Oyez Editors, n.d.).

Following the *Civil Rights Cases* (1883), the Supreme Court case *Shelley v. Kraemer* (1948) demonstrates the Court’s evolution in its application of Constitutional protections against the actions of private entities. In *Shelley v. Kraemer* (1948), the Shelleys, an African-American family, moved into a home in a St. Louis, Missouri neighborhood. In their neighborhood, there was an existing covenant between the residents that barred the Shelleys from living there due to their race. The covenant had been signed in 1911 between owners of property in the neighborhood, and stipulated that for fifty years, no people would be able to live on their land unless they were white. Since the covenant was active when the Shelleys moved in, the neighborhood wanted the court to remove the Shelleys from their property, as they were African-American. When this case was brought to the Missouri Supreme Court, the Court ruled that the covenant was to be upheld. The Shelleys argued that the Missouri Supreme Court’s upholding of the covenant qualified as a judicial State action, and was racially discriminatory and hence unconstitutional. They then brought their case before the Supreme Court. In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Vinson wrote that “Since the decision of this Court in the *Civil Rights Cases* (1883), the principle has become firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States. That Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful” (Epstein et al., 2022, p. 550; *Shelley v. Kraemer*, 1948). The majority opinion made clear that Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended and long understood to be applicable to government actions, not to those of private entities.

Although the state-action requirement affirms that the

protections of the Constitution apply to State activity only, the government's involvement in actions of private entities presents an area of uncertainty. If the government is substantially involved in a private entity's activity, then such actions can be considered to be governmental rather than purely private. The ruling in *Shelley v. Kraemer* (1948) takes this deliberation into account, stating: "Where... it is clear that the action of the State violates the terms of the fundamental charter, it is the obligation of the Court so to declare" (Epstein et al., 2022, p. 551; *Shelley v. Kraemer*, 1948). In the *Shelley* decision, the Missouri State Supreme Court's upholding of the privately-held and racially-restrictive covenant was determined to qualify as a discriminatory State action, making it unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. The ruling of *Shelley v. Kraemer* (1948) shows that the Court's determination of government involvement in a private entity's activity allows for a more flexible interpretation of the state-action requirement than when it was applied in the Civil Rights Cases (1883). This expanding application of the state-action requirement reflects an aspect of original intent. As Chief Justice Vinson remarked in *Shelley v. Kraemer* (1948), the framers of the Constitution had a desire to place limits on government powers to safeguard individual liberties, while also allowing for people and businesses to function with autonomy (*Shelley v. Kraemer*, 1948). To adhere to the protections of the Constitution and to maintain the autonomy of citizens and businesses, the government's involvement in the actions of private entities must be analyzed by the Court. This consideration introduces the prospect of social media companies' activities being limited under the First and Fourteenth Amendment's protections.

With society continuously evolving and innovating, the channels through which the government can be an actor in a private entity's operations blurs the distinction of purely private behavior in the application of the state-action requirement. The dynamic relationship between government and private entities makes sufficient State involvement more difficult for the Court to determine, especially given society's increasing usage of, and dependence on, communication and technology platforms. Stemming from this relationship, the policies and actions of social media companies have been targeted by claims of individual free speech being limited – especially through censorship.

Although the state-action requirement and previous court cases have attempted to clarify the First

Amendment's applicability to private entities' activities, questions pertaining to social media companies' limitation of free speech have been frequently disputed in recent years. For example, a case was heard by the Supreme Court considering an impending law in Texas which relates to social media platforms' obstruction of free speech (Kern, 2022). This law would give the state of Texas and its individual citizens the ability to sue social media companies upon claims of infringement of free speech. Representing the ongoing debate over questions of this type, the Court issued a split decision (5-4) to "suspend" the law from being implemented while lawsuits involving social media violation of free speech progress through the lower courts (Kern, 2022). This case illustrates the judicial uncertainty in distinguishing the actions of the government versus those of private social media companies.

In the future, if the Court is to rule on a case that considers a social media platform's limitation of free speech, it should utilize the state-action requirement and associated precedent cases to develop an analysis-based standard to address questions of this type. At the base of this standard would be the assumption that the purely private actions of entities cannot be prohibited by the Constitution, given the document's lack of authority over such. Following this, the standard would guide the process of analysis to determine whether the government was sufficiently involved in a social media company's behavior to warrant the application of Constitutional protections. To determine the level of government involvement, the Court should meticulously examine and consider the communication that a social media company has had with a State actor, as well as subsequent actions taken by the platform that could have been influenced by such correspondence. Written or spoken correspondence in which a government entity is directing, suggesting, mentioning, or displaying any involvement in the actions or policies of a private company can serve to satisfy the burden of proving substantial government involvement (American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California).

A pertinent example of what would be considered as substantial State involvement in private actions is documented requests by government officials for social media companies to change their terms and conditions. Investigating this potential occurrence, in 2016, the ACLU sent requests to have access to the federal government's "policies and actions" in correspondence with social media companies through

the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). In the past, there have been reports of government officials communicating with social media companies, such as Facebook, and requesting amendments to their terms and conditions (Cagle & Handeyside, 2016). However, as Hugh Handeyside (former Senior Staff Attorney for the ACLU National Security Project) notes, these requests are often made in closed-door meetings and are not documented (Cagle & Handeyside, 2016). Since many social media companies' treatment of speech is dependent upon their terms and conditions, changes to such provisions in adherence to federal requests is a practice of government censorship by proxy. This demonstration of government correspondence and influence in the activities of private entities constitutes behavior that can be limited or prohibited under Constitutional protections (Cagle & Handeyside, 2016). The possible evidence sought by the ACLU is an example of substantial government involvement which allows Constitutional protections of free speech to be applied to a private entity. Other forms of evidence that render sufficient State involvement could include government influence in private companies' implementation of policies and responses to specific accounts, posts, comments, or hashtags (American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California). Through the Court's analysis and determination process, it is crucial that if evidence does not display sufficient government involvement, the Constitution's protections cannot limit the activities of private entities. This scrutiny maintains the autonomy of private individuals and businesses, as well as the integrity of the state-action requirement. As technology has evolved and new forms of speech have arisen, the rigid distinction between the actions of the

government and those of private entities has needed to change to better determine the applicability of Constitutional protections. Accounting for the dynamic relationship between government, digital communication companies, and society, the Court has begun to take a more analytical approach to determine whether such companies have maintained an absence of government influence in their ventures – especially those that limit free speech. With a foundational assumption rooted in the state-action requirement and approach guided by the *Shelley v. Kraemer* (1948) precedent, a standard process should be established to adequately analyze and determine whether the government substantially influences a private entity's conduct, warranting the application of Constitutional protections. Through this approach, the freedom of private individuals and companies from State interference is respected. Simultaneously, citizens' Constitutional rights are protected from evolving threats – many of which emanate from the dynamic and complicated relations between the government, technology, and society.

“The Connectivity of Religion in Books One and Ten of Plato’s *Republic*”

by Raleigh Adams

Religion in Plato’s *Republic* serves as a bookending device of Books One and Ten of the dialogue. Book One demonstrates the conventional religion of Athens, characterized by Cephalus, while Book Ten depicts a different religiosity, one intertwined with philosophy, that was developed and characterized by Socrates.

Conversely, organized religion, on the whole, is missing from the broad middle section of the dialogue detailing the City in Speech. Throughout the dialogue, Plato, through Socrates, creates a fusion of the religious and philosophic lives that were once in tension, thus encouraging the virtuous life and afterlife.

The dialogue opens with Socrates retelling to an unknown party how he went down to the Piraeus with Glaucon the day before. He made the journey for two reasons: to pray to the goddess and to see how the city would hold her

festival for the first time. Socrates says the procession was fine but no better than others he had seen. After they had prayed and looked on, the two went to town, where Polemarchus caught them. The bulk of the dialogue commences as the two men are brought back to Polemarchus’ home, with Socrates eventually charged by the other men to define and defend the inherent value of the just life.

Once at the home, Polemarchus’ father, Cephalus, is introduced. He is an elderly man, preoccupied with sacrifices to the gods: “... he seemed very old... He was seated on a sort of cushioned stool and was crowned with a wreath, for he had just performed a sacrifice in the courtyard.”¹ This initial description of Cephalus is one of piety and concern for the gods, at least superficially. Cephalus is inherently tied to convention. His life was spent in a debaucherous youth, and once the

pleasures and beauty of the body fade and death looms at the door, the latter half of life is used to turn desperately to the matters of the soul's health and repentance. Cephalus knows his past was scandalous and unjust, that his adolescence was characterized by "the pleasures of youth...sex...drinking bouts and feasts and all that goes on with that sort," and that is why he embraces established faith now that death approaches.² The old man is willing to neatly define justice in concurrence with the public opinion out of safety, convenience, and reputation. This contrasts with Cephalus' apparent friendship with the philosopher. The old man greets the corrupter of the youth warmly, presumably agreeing with Socrates' practices with the youth, yet does not partake in or subject himself to that same treatment. Cephalus takes the chance he is offered to run from a deeper conversation about justice, instead allowing Polemarchus to inherit his place in discourse with Socrates.

It may be objectionable that both Cephalus and Socrates alike display traditional religion in Book One. However, while Cephalus is religious in the way desired by the city, Socrates holds no such pretenses. The philosopher was motivated to the opening religious festival for prayer, but was also curious to see the novel event itself, "I went down to the Piraeus...to pray to the goddess; and at the same time, I wanted to observe how they would put on the festival, since they were now holding it for the first time."³ This curiosity is perhaps far more genuine than his religious motivation. There is a necessity to his prayer. It is expected, a chore to be done. The questioning that brings Socrates to the festival, however, is a pleasure. Socrates is aligned with the city in that he goes through the motions of welcoming the new god into the Athenian fold, yet his ties go no further than that. Any piety he may hold is corrupted by his curiosity. In Cephalus' form of religion, true faith is lacking. Rather, man is a slave to the mores of his city and time, with no true control over his belief. His city is his god just as much as any actual deity, it is the city that dictates what is pious and just. It is a political religion where belief equates to citizenship and has disastrous consequences if not followed properly, as seen in Socrates' own life. This enslavement can be alleviated with money and abiding by the established practices, but is never fully escapable.


In sending Cephalus, who had equated the divine and the just, away from the group of interlocutors, Socrates strips the divine from his search for justice. It is possible that this was either an act of mercy to let an old man be blissfully ignorant at the end of his life, or

the gods are not a central concern to Socrates' search for the just at all. In effect, any ties between the just and the gods have been severed. This is further solidified by the presence of religion in Book Two in the City of Pigs, or the Healthy City, yet lacking for the most part in the Feverish City prompted by Glaucon. The gods are present, but they are present through the lens of concern for the education of the guardian class, seen in Books Two and Three. Stories of the gods are subject to censorship, and utilized as tools to encourage the desired virtues and attitudes in the guardian class, rather than actual objects of worship. Socrates has made man the pinnacle of the city.

The dialogue progresses through the creation of the City in Speech with little mention of any form of piety. However, concern with the gods and the afterlife is reintroduced in Book Ten via the myth of Er, possibly subverting the work the men had done in giving inherent value to the just life on Earth. This turn to the afterlife removes any intrinsic value from the just life once more if its reward is found beyond this plane of existence. The myth of Er shows how the civic virtues practiced in life can benefit a man greatly. If he is just, a thousand-year voyage to the afterlife through the beautiful heavens awaits him, but if he is vicious in life, his voyage will be through the rough pits of hell instead. But once he is in Hades to choose their next life, virtue is of little help. Here, philosophy is so direly important to choose the next life well and not end up in the life of a tragic tyrant or doomed animal.

There is no sin but ignorance in the afterlife. Each soul is held accountable for their actions in their prior life as well as their choice for their next life. These people are held to the consequences of both their virtues and vices. There is no divine knowledge to aid the choice in the afterlife if one did not philosophize while they were still alive. For all men save the philosopher, there is a constant change from happiness to misery and back, like being stuck in the currents of a river from one life to the next. However, this accountability also creates autonomy for those who philosophize in life through the opportunity to choose the conditions of their afterlife and next life. The myth of Er takes power away from the divine and places it in the hands of man and his reason, culminating in Socrates creating a religion of philosophy and reason. However, this is not a complete transfer of control to man. This is seen when the myth of Er is held in comparison to the Allegory of the Cave, that man is not the complete master of his destiny but rather still in need of being set free.

Both peaks of the dialogue see the use of a myth. That



of the myth of Er in Book Ten, and that of the Allegory of the Cave in Book Seven. In the Allegory of the Cave, the process of enlightenment is described. Men are held in the bottom of the cave, every moveable part of their bodies chained since birth, only able to see the dancing shadows on the cave wall before them,

They are in it [the cave] from childhood, with their legs and necks in bonds so that they are fixed, seeing only in front of them... There is a light from a fire burning far above and behind them. Between the fire and the prisoners there is a road above, along which see a wall, built like the partitions puppet-handlers set in front of the human beings and over which they show the puppets.⁴

From this partition, there are “human beings carrying all sorts of artifacts, which project above the wall, and statues of men and other animals... some of the carriers utter sounds while others are silent.”⁵ These shadows of the artifacts displayed and the sounds made by their holders are the only stimuli known to the bound men, and some develop the art of predicting the shadows’ patterns and presumed meaning. These people hold that “the truth is nothing other than the shadows of artificial things,” because they know no better.⁶ They are literally and proverbially in the dark.

However, according to the allegory, philosophy frees one of the bound men from the cave. His bonds are released as he is “suddenly compelled to stand up, turn his neck

around, to walk and look up toward the light; and who, moreover, is doing all this in pain and, because he is dazzled, is unable to make out those things who shadows he saw before”⁷ The process is painful and confusing, but brings the free man closer to the truth, “before he saw silly nothings, while now, because he is somewhat nearer to what is and more turned toward beings, he sees more correctly.”⁸ The man is brought out of the cave and slowly adjusts to the sun’s light, first in seeing light versus shadow, then reflections, then the real thing. Concurrently, he is slowly accepting the truth of the world as well.⁹ The degrees of separation between man and the truth have been deconstructed, and he is slowly yet surely able to reach the singular form of the good. He is enlightened and transcendent, yet mocked, and even in danger, by those still within the cave.¹⁰

If one couples this earlier allegory and the ultimate myth of the afterlife, then a possible vision for a new religion being put forth by Socrates begins to take shape.

Socrates’ vision of the enlightened man coming to know a sole form of the good is reminiscent of later monotheistic beliefs, amenable to the Judeo-Christian faiths to come after the dialogue’s writing even, instead of the polytheistic beliefs of the philosopher’s time. Through the process of philosophy and seeking the truth, the enlightened man comes to know goodness itself, and is connected to the higher forms. He has not only mentally but spiritually transcended as well. The afterlife described in the myth of Er is the reward for those who choose this

life. Although the process of leaving the cave is described as painful, even dangerous, it brings the ultimate reward of preparation for the next life. This is not unlike the justification given in sects of Judeo-Christian faith, that the toils of the temporal world and living according to a set of virtues on Earth plant the seeds for rewards in the next. This negates to some degree a broad portion of the dialogue, which was intended to give inherent justification for the just life while living. If the true rewards lie in being ready for Hades as is described in the myth, then it is possible that Socrates' work in the dialogue has been all for naught or possibly proves instead something beyond the goal originally laid out.

It is far more likely, however, that the myth of Er is Socrates' acknowledgment that the men accompanying him are ultimately still in the darkness of the cave and thus is feeding them a facet of the truth for them to be able to handle, instead of the truth in its entirety. The answer to if the myth of Er is simply Socrates holding a new artifact up for the men around him, partaking in a real version of the cave, and trying to ease these men into the truth, is left uncertain. If so, Socrates' interlocutors are incapable of fully grasping the just life and afterlife being proposed, but rather still in the process of being set free from the cave.

The two types of religiosity bookending the *Republic* are of very different natures. The first, characterized by the elderly Cephalus, is a blind and unknowing, albeit safe, one. Cephalus clings to his possibly false relation to the just because he is too close to the end of his life not to. To use the language of the Allegory of the Cave, he is content to remain in his chains, viewing the shadows of conventional piety on the cave wall. Socrates, on the other hand, creates via the myth of Er a vision of religion that needs philosophy. Socrates

puts forth a faith that calls upon man and his ability instead of a deference to convention and tradition. Man must actively work to leave the cave with the aid of philosophy, and come to know the divine and good. Socrates ties faith and reason together, where the two doctrines are so often put in opposition, so that only by living the philosophic life and overcoming one's passions may one know the good in life and succeed in Hades.

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¹⁴ Wilson Jr., *The 758th Tank Battalion in World War II: The U.S. Army's First All African American Tank Unit*, 46.

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1. Phillips, “The examination and confession of certaine Wytches at Chensforde,” 72 – 82.
2. These services included slaughtering eighteen sheep, destroying the goods and body of Andrew Byles, aiding her in procuring a herbal abortion, murdering her living child, and laming her husband.
3. Phillips, “The examination and confession of certaine Wytches at Chensforde,” 74.
4. Ibid., 76.
5. Goodcole, “The Wonderfull Discouerie of Elizabeth Savvyer,” 6.
6. Phillips, “The examination and confession of certaine Wytches at Chensforde,” 81.
7. Potts, *The Wonderfull Discoverie of Witches*, 23.; Sowthernes, due to her old age and the terrible conditions of the gaol, died before she could be tried for witchcraft.
8. Ibid., 70.
9. Ibid., 24.
10. Ibid., 36.
11. Levack, *The Witch-hunt in Early Modern Europe*, 145-146.
12. Potts, *The Wonderfull Discoverie of Witches*, 36.
13. Thomas, *Religion and the Decline of Magic*, 677.
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17. Goodcole, "The Wonderfvl Discouerie of Elizabeth Savvyer a Witch Late of Edmonton," 3.
18. Ibid., 4.
19. Ibid., 3.
20. Ibid., 4.
21. Ibid., 3.
22. Ibid., 6.
23. Ibid., 7.
24. Ibid., 6.
25. Whitaker, *An History of the Original Parish of Whalley*, 301 – 302.
26. Charles I - volume 271: July 1-16, 1634," 153.
27. There are no other records of testimonies apart from Robinson's, nor is there any mention of other testimonies in the existing records.
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29. "Charles I - Volume 270: June 21-31, 1634," 98.
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37. Ibid., 162-163.
38. Gaskill, *Witchfinders*, 130.
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40. Ibid.
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